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ABSTRACT 
The decade from 1965 to 1975 is generally considered as a 
period of ill health for the U.S. economy.    Economic crisis is 
defined as a time when there exists a combination of severe 
(greater than 5%) inflation and unemployment; thirty percent of the 
last decade would be classified as a crisis period under this 
definition. 
Four goals for the U.S. political economy are discussed: 
reduction of simultaneous inflation and unemployment; reduction of 
structural inequities; reduction of the government's tendency to 
outspend its level of revenues; and having a holistic approach to 
national policy-making. 
The economic crisis is examined from three perspectives:   a 
business perspective articulated by Albert T. Sommers,  Chief 
Economist of the Conference Board; a reformist viewpoint voiced 
by John Kenneth Galbraith; arid a radical critique by neo-Marxist 
James O'Connor.    The three economists diagnose the economic 
crisis as stemming from a variety of causes:   rising demands for 
distributive and social justice; uneven development of two seg- 
ments of the economy — the planning system and the market 
system; and the inherent contradiction of the capitalistic system. 
In keeping with their divergent diagnoses, the political 
economists propose a variety of contradictory solutions to help 
solve the U.S. economic crisis.   Despite their diverse outlooks 
and proposed solutions,  all seem to feel that national economic 
planning merits further investigation as a possible solution to the 
U.S. economic crisis. 
The paper examines the following propositions: 
1. National economic planning (NEP) and enactment 
of the Humphrey-Javits Balanced Growth and Economic 
Planning Act in particular could help solve the economic 
crisis.   However,  other goals which are set for the 
political economy may not be achieved by national 
economic planning,  and will not be achieved by SI795. 
2. A holistic approach to national economic planning is 
necessary.    The Humphrey-Javits bill provides a 
mechanism for such an approach.   However,  the bill 
does not mandate consideration of the global or social 
ramifications of plans made under the auspices of SI795. 
3. The Humphrey-Javits bill will lead to effective 
implementation of the plan developed through its 
mechanism.   However, heavy reliance on voluntary 
compliance is likely to lead to difficulties. 
The paper concludes that: 
1. National economic planning could help achieve the 
goal of reduced inflation and unemployment; however, 
the ability of NEP to alter the political decisions and 
actions which have contributed to the economic crisis „ 
is highly questionable. 
2. S1795 has potential for reducing simultaneous inflation 
and unemployment,  as well as some possibility for 
providing a basis for the coordination necessary for 
a holistic approach to natural problem solving,  although 
such an approach is not mandated.    The other two goals 
for the political economy proba'bly would not be achieved 
by enactment of the measure. 
3. S1795 does not provide satisfactory assurance that the 
balanced economic growth plan would be effectively 
implemented in its totality.   Heavy reliance on 
voluntary compliance makes it likely that unless the 
political power centers are altered,  only those parts 
of the plan which favor those particular entities would 
be implemented. 
BALANCED GROWTH AND ECONOMIC PLANNING:   A CRITIQUE 
OF S1795 
INTRODUCTION 
There appears to be general agreement that the U. S.  economy 
is in the throes of a crisis,  characterized by rapid inflation coupled 
with high unemployment and heavy reliance of the economy on govern- 
ment intervention and expenditures.    The existence of such a crisis 
has presented an opportunity for examination of an assortment of 
goals which various theorists have suggested that the economy should 
achieve,  including redistribution of wealth and income,  reduced 
inflation,  lowered unemployment,   reduction of government deficit 
spending, and accommodation of demands for achievement of social 
goals such as environmental protection and good global citizenship. 
Since goals for the functioning of the economy differ,  it is not 
surprising that theorists posit a variety of solutions to the current 
crisis of the economy.    At one end of the spectrum is the voice of 
the U. S.   Chamber of Commerce,  arguing that in order for inflation 
to be reduced, the government should refrain from excessive 
interference with the economy in order to permit the free enterprise 
system to right itself from the precarious position in which the 
government has placed it.    Close to the Chamber's position is that 
expressed by Albert T.  Sommers,  Chief Economist of The Con- 
ference Board,  who feels that inflation and unemployment should be 
4 
reduced by restraining social demands which have stretched the 
economy beyond its ability to accommodate such demands.      At the 
other end of the spectrum are neo-Marxists like James O'Conner who 
assert that the fiscal crisis of the state is the harvest of capitalistic 
seeds.    Since "the capitalistic state must try to fulfill two basic and 
often mutually contradictory functions - accumulation and legitimiza- 
tion^"    it brings the fiscal crisis upon itself by socializing more and 
more of the capital costs of the economy but permitting the profits of 
3 
the economy to be privately appropriated.      Critics such as O'Connor 
see "a socialist perspective that seeks to redefine needs in collective 
4 
terms"    as the only complete solution to the fiscal crisis of the 
state.    O'Connor would set redistribution of income and wealth as 
primary goals for the economy,  in addition to the reduction of 
unemployment and inflation.    Somewhere between the spectrum's two 
extremes lies another theorist,  John Kenneth Galbraith, who is 
sensitive to the goal which is emphasized by the business community - 
Albert T. Sommers,   "inflation,  Unemployment and Stabilization 
Policy, " The Conference Board Record,  XIII,   9 (September 1976), 
p.  57. 
James O'Connor,  The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: 
St. Martin's Press,   1973),  p.  6. 
3Ibid.,  p.  9. 
4Ibid.,  p.  255. 
reduced inflation - but also feels that lowering unemployment and 
reducing structural inequities of the society are other important 
5 
goals which the political economy should achieve. 
A LEGISLATIVE APPROACH FOR SOLVING THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
Two prominent U. S.  Senators,  Hubert Humphrey and Jacob 
Javits, have recognized the crisis of the U. S.  economy,  and have 
proposed a legislative measure which they believe will provide a 
mechanism for solving the crisis.    These two ranking members of 
the Joint Economic Committee have co-sponsored S1795,  The 
Balanced Growth and Economic Planning Act,  which would establish 
a procedure for creating a long-term national economic plan.    Such 
a plan is deemed necessary because 
the United States is suffering its worst economic decline 
since the 1930's.    The combination of severe inflation and 
recession has disrupted the Nation's economy and has 
caused hardship for millions of Americans.    Recession 
and inflation have both revealed basic structural de- 
ficiencies in the United States economy and have been 
intensified by conflicting and erratic short-term economic 
policies without in many cases providing long-term 
solutions. " 
The findings of the bill state that the lack of a long-term national 
5 John Kenneth Galbraith,  Economics and The Public Purpose 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,   1973),  pp.  264-273. 
°The Balanced Growth and Economic Planning Act S.   1795, 
94th Cong,   lstsess.,  21 May 1975,  Sec.  202(a). 
national economic policy has caused "fundamental imbalances in 
,,7 
the economy. 
The purposes of the Humphrey-Javits bill include:   establishment 
of an Economic Planning Board which would be responsible for 
developing a draft balanced economic growth plan every two years, 
taking into consideration long-range economic trends and resource 
constraints;   and provision for appropriate public participation in 
refining the plan. 
Senator Humphrey provided a concise description of the proposed 
planning procedure in his introductory remarks in the May 21,   1975 
Congressional Record: 
The bill creates an Economic Planning Board in the Office 
of the President, composed of three persons nominated by 
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
The function of the Board is to draft a proposed balanced 
economic growth plan.    It does this with the assistance of 
the Council on Economic Planning,  made up of the President's 
Cabinet and other high-ranking officials,  and an Advisory 
Committee on Economic Planning composed of 12 persons, 
4 appointed by the President and 8 appointed by the 
Congress. 
The bill also provides congressional and local participa- 
tion roles that are of central importance in the planning 
process.    Under the bill, the President will submit his 
proposed plan to Congress every 2 years.    He will also 
submit copies of his proposed plan to the Governors of 
each State at the same time that the plan is submitted to 
Congress. 
7Ibid.,  Sec.  202 (b). 
The Joint Economic Committee will be responsible for 
holding hearings on the proposed plan and for reporting 
a concurrent resolution to the House and the Senate, 
approving,  rejecting, or modifying the proposed plan. 
Prior to holding its hearings,  the Joint Economic 
Committee will receive views and comments on the pro- 
posed plan from each of the standing committees of 
Congress.    In addition,  the Governor of each State is 
given the opportunity to submit a report to the Joint 
Economic Committee responding to the proposed plan. 
Each Governor's report, as we envision it, will in- 
clude the views of other local officials and citizens 
within the State,  in accordance with procedures to be 
established by the Governor. ° 
Senators Humphrey and Javits are the prime sponsors of the 
bill.    Other prominent senators such as Henry Jackson,  George 
McGovern,  Birch Bayh,, and Thomas Eagleton co-sponsored the 
bill upon its introduction.    Several days later Senator Metcalf and 
Senator Williams were added to the list of co-sponsors. 
Upon introducing the bill,  Senator Humphrey commented that 
the Balanced Growth and Economic Planning Act was an extremely 
important bill,  perhaps the most important one which he had 
authored in his Senate career.    He said it represented months of 
9 
effort on his and Senator Javits1 part. 
Initial public reaction to the planning bill was not nearly so 
negative as might have been the case in past decades.    For 
8Congressional Record,  21 May 1975,  p.  S8831. 
9Ibid. 
8 
example,  an article previewing S1795 by Jack Friedman in the May 
18,   1975 New York Times concluded that "At this time Congress, 
the Administration,  the business sector and labor are increasingly 
receptive to planning - if it does not lead to government control over 
industry.    Sentiment is growing in the United States for more long- 
term,  coordinated government approaches to economic problems. 
And this is the substance of planning. " 
When hearings were held June 12,   1975,  George G. Hagedorn, 
Vice President and Chief Economist of the National Association of 
Manufacturers, testified on the Balanced Growth and Economic 
Planning Act.    He stated that 
Government economic programs and policies need to be 
better planned in several respects.    More careful 
consideration needs to be given to which economic 
functions can best be performed by government,  and 
which are best left to the free market.    More attention 
needs to be given to the long-range effects of govern- 
ment actions,  as compared with their immediate 
effects.    Greater recognition needs to be given to the 
indirect impact of government policies . .. which is 
often not visible to the untrained eye,  and is usually 
not intended by the authors of the policies. 
Planning that leads in this direction can provide better 
guides to government decision-making than we have had 
in the recent past.    Superficial planning,  more concerned 
with setting impressive numerical goals than with devis- 
ing realistic means for achieving them,  can make things 
worse. 
10Jack Friedman,   "A Planned Economy in the United States, " 
The New York Times (May 18,   1975). 
George G.  Hagedorn,  unpublished testimony before the Joint 
Economic Committee of Congress (June 12,   1975) pp. 9-10. 
9 
The bill also has received the support of notables such as 
Wassily Leontief,  recipient of the Nobel Prize in economics and 
12 Leonard Woodcock,  president of the United Auto Workers. 
After the initial focus on the Humphrey-Javits Balanced Growth 
and Economic Planning Act,  public attention was redirected to the 
less-comprehensive Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment and 
Balanced Growth Act,   (S50,  HR50),  which had a goal of 3% unemploy- 
ment within three years.    Initial reaction to that bill was much more 
negative than to the Humphrey-Javits bill,  perhaps because S50 was 
more specific with respect to unemployment goals, while not paying 
as much attention to the problem of inflation in the economy.   A 
modification of the purpose of the Humphrey-Haw kins bill,  but not 
support for the bill itself,  was adopted as a plank of the Democratic 
party platform for the 1976 presidential campaign. 
Thus while the short-term outlook for the Humphrey-Javits 
Balanced Growth and Economic Planning Act is uncertain,   since 
it died in committee at the end of the 94th Congress and its 
reintroduction is not guaranteed,  it appears quite likely that the 
concept of national economic planning is one which is beginning to 
receive serious national consideration,  and certainly one which 
merits further analysis. 
12Richard L.  Strout,   "Should U. S.  Have a '5-Year Plan? ', " 
Christian Science Monitor (May 15,   1975). 
10 
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD MAKES HOLISTIC PROBLEM-SOLVING 
NECESSARY 
The world is interdependent economically,   socially,  and 
politically,  mandating a holistic approach to effective problem - 
solving at the national level.    To illustrate the United States' 
economic dependence on other nations,  it is necessary to look no 
further than the disrupting effect of the 1973-1974 OPEC oil embargo 
on the United States' economy.    Despite such disruption and nearly 
two years of rhetoric about becoming energy independent,  the 
dependent condition remains.    Latest figures indicate that 41% of 
13 the petroleum consumed in the United States is imported.       The 
United States is also quite dependent on other nations for basic raw 
materials such as zinc,   chromium,   etc.   - critical items for a 
highly-industrialized economy such as that of the United States in 
the 197O's.    The country also needs other nations as markets for 
the output of its industrialized economy.    Conversely,  the develop- 
ing nations (e. g.,  OPEC countries) are dependent upon the United 
States and other developed countries for technological equipment 
and processes,  and need the industrialized countries as markets 
for their raw materials. 
Global social interdependence is again easy to identify. 
Perhaps the best illustration is the total disregard for nation- 
13 U.S.,  Department of the Interior,  August 21,   1976. 
11 
state boundaries displayed by environmental pollution.    One 
nation's smokestacks make another nation suffer.   Another example 
is the global communications network which provides the means for 
cultural interaction and adaptation.    Improvement in communica- 
tions networks also provides increased opportunities for economic 
interdependence. 
Political interdependence can be seen in many ways - groups 
of nations covenanting to come to the aid of one another in the event 
of attack (NATO, SEA TO,  etc.), which in turn contributes to a 
political determination of the level of a country's military spending, 
based on the level of spending of one's allies and perceived enemies. 
The authors of Mankind at the Turning Point,  a sequel to the Club 
of Rome-sponsored Limits to Growth, suggest that the real limits 
to growth for the world will be political,  not economic, 
14 technological, or resource-based. 
Robert L. Heilbroner ably pictures the current state of global 
interdependency in An Inquiry into the Human Prospect.    He 
concludes that every nation,  and particularly the United States, 
must learn to live as a good global citizen if the civilization of 
14 Mihajlo Mesarovic,  Eduard Postel,  Mankind at the Turning 
Point:   The Second Report to the Club of Rome (New York:    E.  P. 
Dutlon Co.,  Inc./Reader's Digest Press,   1974),  p.   66. 
12 
' IS the planet is to survive. 
PURPOSE OF THE PAPER 
This critique of the Humphrey-Javits Balanced Growth and 
Economic Planning Act will proceed from the proposition that there 
does exist an economic crisis in the United States which is viewed 
from various perspectives.   As mentioned earlier, this proposition 
is one which seems to have support from groups as widely divergent 
as the U.S.  Chamber of Commerce and the neo-Marxists.    O'Connor, 
a neo-Marxist,  defines the fiscal crisis of the state as the "tendency 
,.16 for government expenditures to outrace revenues. George 
Hagedorn,  speaking for the National Association of Manufacturers, 
characterized the economic crisis as a "steady worsening in the 
character pf business recessions:   We had a 'mini-recession' in 
1967; an ordinary 'garden-variety recession' in 1970; and finally, 
17 
what has to be called a 'maxi-recession' in 1975. "       Albert T. 
Sommers,  Chief Economist of the Conference Board,  a business 
research organization, has commented that "the economic record 
of the United States over the past decade has been such as to justify 
Robert L. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect 
(New York:   W. W.  Norton & Company, Inc.,   1974), pp 21-48. 
16 O'Connor,  p.  2. 
Hagedorn, p.  5. - 
13 
18 
concern among reasonable persons. "       John Kenneth Galbraith, 
noted Harvard economist,  comments on the economy's suscepti- 
19 bility to inflation and recession.        The Humphrey-Javits bill sees 
the combination of severe inflation and recession as indicating that 
there are deficiencies in the structure of the economy of the United 
States.    The bill states that many conflicting short-term economic 
policies have contributed to the economic crisis without providing 
20 long-term solutions. 
This paper will define the primary characteristic of an 
economic crisis as rapid inflation (greater than 5%) coupled with 
high unemployment (greater than 5%) over a prolonged (one year 
or longer) period of time.    It will consider a variety of possible 
causes of the economic crisis by discussing the analyses of 
Albert T.  Sommers,  John Kenneth Galbraith,  and James O'Connor. 
Proceeding from this base of analysis,  the paper will consider 
national economic planning as a possible solution to the crisis. 
Finally,  the Humphrey-Javits Balanced Growth and Economic 
Planning Act will be evaluated as a possible national economic 
planning mechanism which would solve the U. S.  economic crisis. 
Sommers, p.  52. 
19Galbraith,  p.   188. 
20s.  1795,  Sec.  202 (a). 
14 
The following propositions will be examined in this paper: 
1. National economic planning (NEP) and enactment of 
S1795 in particular could help solve the economic 
crisis of the United States.    That is,  NEP and S1795 
could enable the inflation rate to be reduced to a 
manageable level while unemployment is also being 
reduced.    However, other goals which are set for 
the political economy may not be achieved by national • 
economic planning,  and will not be achieved by S1795. 
These goals include changes in the structural inequities 
underlying the economy,   such as the wide disparity 
between rich and poor.   Another goal is the slowing 
of the tendency for government spending to outrun 
revenues:   NEP may not achieve this goal and S1795 
probably will not. 
2. A holistic approach to national economic planning is 
necessary.    The Humphrey-Javits bill provides a 
mechanism for such an approach.    Yet the bill does 
not mandate consideration of the global ramifications 
of plans made under the auspices of S1795.    Moreover, 
the bill does not overtly consider the necessity or 
desirability of social planning,  nor does it recognize 
that social planning is a de facto concomitant of 
economic planning. 
3. The Humphrey-Javits Balanced Growth and Economic 
Planning Act will lead to effective implementation 
of the plan developed through its mechanism.    However, 
heavy reliance on voluntary compliance is likely to lead 
to problems such as implementation of only those parts 
of the plan which serve the interests of society's major 
power centers (the planning system,  monopoly sector, 
big business,  big labor). 
15 
CHAPTER 1:   THE CRISIS OF U. S.   POLITICAL ECONOMY- 
THREE PERSPECTIVES 
During the decade from 1965 to 1975,  many traditional indica- 
tors of economic health have registered as "sick. "   This paper will 
base its reading of economic health on two of these indicators -- the 
unemployment rate (total) and the inflation rate as measured by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all items,   seasonally adjusted.    In 
early 1965 the unemployment rate rose above 5%,  but quickly 
declined below that level until mid-1970.    At that time,  unemploy- 
ment increased sharply,  leading to a prolonged period of between 
5 and 6% unemployment through early 1973.    From early 1973 to 
January of the next year,  unemployment decreased below the 5% 
level,  then entered another period of sharp increase to a high of 
9% in mid-1975.    From that time till the end of 1975,  the unemploy- 
ment rate was still above 8%,  and showed no real decrease in the 
first half of 1976.    During the period from 1965 to 1975,  the 
unemployment rate was greater than 5% for 5 years, or roughly 
50% of the decade.    Considering the inflation rate over the same 
period of time,  one finds that from 1965 through mid-1968, 
inflation was below 5%.    From mid-1970 through the end of 1972, 
the inflation rate dipped below 5% for the last time in the decade. 
The years 1973 through the end of 1974 saw unprecedented double 
digit inflation rates of 10%,   11%,  and even 12%.    In 197 5,  the rate 
16 
lowered slightly,  but it was still far above the 5% level.    Even the 
first half of 1976 showed the inflation rate hovering about the 5% 
level.    Over the decade from 1965 to 1975,  the inflation rate was 
greater than 5% for 4 years,  or roughly   40% of the time. 
Other measures of economic and societal well-being do not 
generate such universal concern as have the rates of inflation and 
unemployment.    Some of these - such as the ratio of wealthy people 
to poor people and the small percentage of people holding a large 
portion of the nation's wealth - have remained fairly constant over 
a long period of time.    For example,  in 1947,  the upper 20% of 
families received 43% of total income,  while in 1962 the same 
percentage of families received 42% of total income,  and in 1974 
the same top 20% received 41% of aggregate national income. 
Similarly,  the lowest 20% of families received only 5% of total 
U. S.   income in 1947,   5% again in 1963,   and 5. 5% of total U. S. 
of total U. S. income in 1974  .    More inequitable than the distribu- 
tion of income is the distribution of wealth.    For example,  the 
Federal Reserve Board reported that the top 5% of the U. S.  adult 
U. S.,  Department of Commerce,   Bureau of the Census, 
Consumers Income,  P-60,   103 (Washington,  D. C. : Government 
Printing Office,   September 1976), p.  7.   (1974 data); 
Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington,   D. C. : 
Government Printing Office,   1966),   P.   336.   (1963 data); 
Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 
1957 (Washington,  D. C.:   Government Printing Office,   1960), 
p.   166. 
17 
population held 53% of the wealth of the nation,  and the top 20% 
held 77% of the wealth. 2 
Another indicator of economic well-being has decreased 
markedly over time.    It has generally been considered desirable 
for government expenditures to be kept at a minimal level; yet 
total expenditures by all levels of government have been cal- 
culated to have increased from 12. 8% of GNP in 1945-1950 to 
3 22. 4% in 1966-1970.      Similarly,  attempts to have a national 
budget which was balanced were seemingly discarded with the 
adoption,  in 1972,  of the full-employment budget.    This budget 
serves as a guide to federal spending based on revenues which 
would be collected by a full-employment economy,  rather than 
4 
on actual revenues collected.       Full employment is currently 
defined as 4% unemployment,  although there has been talk of 
that level being changed to 5%. 
The definition employed in this paper for determining a time 
of economic crisis is when there exists a combination of severe 
inflation (greater than 5% annually) and severe unemployment 
(greater than 5% annually).    One reason for choosing to consider 
2 Charles H.  Anderson,  The Political Economy of Social Class, 
(Englewood Cliffs:   Prentice-Hall,  Inc.,   1974),  p.   112. 
3 
O'Connor,  p.   97. 
4Ibid.,  p.   97. 
18 
the combination of severe inflation and unemployment is that in 
current economic theory,   such economic indicators are generally 
held to be inversely related,   i. e.,   as inflation increases,  un- 
5 
employment decreases,  and vice versa.      Since recent years have 
given some evidence that such a relationship,  commonly known as 
the Phillips curve,  may not hold true in all circumstances,  it 
was felt that defining the economic crisis as the combination of 
severe inflation and employment might prove a fruitful starting 
place.    In terms of this definition of economic crisis,   3 of the 
past 10 years can be considered as crisis years,  i. e.,   30% of the 
last decade was a crisis period.    Interestingly,  all of these crisis 
years occurred within the last 5 years. 
. The severity of the crisis has elicited a variety of opinions 
as to the cause of the problem,   and a corresponding number of 
proposed solutions to the economic crisis.    This chapter will 
•examine three different perspectives on the crisis:   a business 
perspective,  formulated by Albert T.  Sommers,   Chief Economist 
of The Conference Board,  a research organization which focuses 
on business affairs; a reformist perspective,  espoused by John 
Kenneth Galbraith,  recently-retired from Harvard University, 
where he served as Paul W. Warburg Professor of Economics, 
and former president of the American Economic Association; 
5 Sommers,   p.   53. 
19 
and a radical perspective,  propounded by James O'Connor,  on the 
faculty of California State University at San Jose. 
A BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE 
According to Sommers,  the chief cause of the economic crisis 
is the rise in demands for social and distributive justice which 
6 has occurred in the past decade.      He bases his analysis on the 
neoclassical model, which can be characterized as follows:   most 
firms are subject to the market insofar as supply,  demand,  and 
price determinations are concerned.    The only exceptions to the 
rule are oligopolies (where the market is shared by only a few 
firms which can set prices) and monopolies (only one firm for a 
particular market,  with prices generally regulated to prevent 
excess profits).    The role of the state is considered to be supple- 
mentary and regulatory.    The state is not viewed as being 
dominated by firms; rather,  the state is subject to the voters' 
wishes through the actions of their elected representatives.    Govern- 
ment expenditures are made in response to the will of the people, 
according to the neoclassical model.    It is generally accepted 
Albert T.  Sommers,  Lucie R.   Blau,  The Widening Cycle: 
An Examination of U. S.  Experience with Stabilization Policy in the 
Last Decade (New York:   The Conference Board,   1975),  p.  36. 
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that the state is responsible for the management of the economy, 
7 
a notion introduced by Keynes. 
A REFORMIST PERSPECTIVE 
Galbraith views the cause of the crisis in a different light. 
He believes that uneven development of the economy has given rise 
to the current economic crisis.    He believes that the neoclassical 
model does not correspond to the current reality of the U. S.  economy. 
In Galbraith1 s view, the failure of the model to correspond to reality 
has lead to economic policies which are ineffective in combatting 
the economic crisis.    Galbraith believes that the neoclassical 
model should be modified to incorporate two separate models of the 
firm:   firms of the planning system and firms of the market system. 
The planning system,  he believes,  is comprised of about one 
thousand big firms which together produce about one half of all 
the goods and services not provided by the state.    These firms,  in 
his estimation, have a much greater ability to set prices,  control 
costs,  and control demand for goods.    The remaining twelve 
million smaller firms - the market system - produce the other 
half of all goods and services not provided by the state.    These 
firms of the market system are subject to market conditions and 
Q 
do indeed behave as the neoclassical model suggests. 
7Galbraith,  pp.  20-23. 
8Ibid.,  pp.  42-43. 
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The role of the state is quite different when viewed from the 
planning system perspective than when it is viewed from the market 
system.    The planning system has a very close relationship with the 
state.    It relies on the state for stimulation of demand,  supply of 
educated manpower, and the provision and maintenance of the 
necessary infrastructure for transportation,  communication,  etc. 
Without government intervention,  the planning system is inherently 
unstable. 
In marked contrast,  the market system does not have the same 
10 
need for or entree to the government that the planning system has. 
The market system,  in isolation from the planning system,  is 
inherently self-correcting and stable within boundaries.   However, 
when operating in the same environment as that in which the plan- 
ning system functions,  the market system suffers from government 
policies which are undertaken to help stabilize the planning 
11 
system.        Galbraith feels that the distribution of public resources 
reflect the power of the planning system and the relative lack of 
12 power of the market system over the state. 
9Ibid_.,  p.  156. 
l0Ibid.,  pp.   159-160. 
Ibid.,  p.  181. 
12Ibid.,  p.  200. 
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A RADICAL PERSPECTIVE 
James O'Connor believes that the chief cause of the economic 
crisis is the inherent contradiction of capitalism, that is,  that the 
state must try to fulfill two basic conflicting functions: accumulation 
and legitimization.    By this he means that the capitalist state must 
provide or maintain conditions under which profitable accumulation 
of capital is possible in order for the free enterprise system to 
function.   At the same time, the state must create or. continue a 
13 
situation in which social harmony prevails.        According to 
O'Connor,  the state is forced to socialize more and more costs to 
fulfill its role of legitimization; yet at the same time the profits 
of the system which is legitimized continue to be privately appro- 
14 
priated. 
He believes that the economy should be divided into three 
sectors for proper analysis - the monopoly sector, the competitive 
sector,  and the state sector.    In O'Connor's model,  the monopoly 
sector comprises about one third of the labor force of the United 
States.    Firms of this sector can be characterized as those with 
markets which are national or international in scope.    Growth of 
130'Connor,  p.  6. 
14Ibid. ,  pp.  6-9. 
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production in these firms depends on increases in the ratio of 
physical capital per worker,  and on technological advance rather 
15 
than on increases in employment.        Wages and prices in this 
sector are not set by the market.    Prices are administered by 
the corporations themselves,  and wages are determined by pro- 
ductivity,  the cost of living,  and settlements with the unions. 
According to O'Connor,  the money wages thus set are the main 
16 determinant of monopoly sector prices. 
The competitive sector, which also employs about one third 
of the U. S. labor force,  can be characterized as being composed 
of those firms with a low physical capital to labor ratio and low 
productivity,  that is,  low output per worker.    Growth of produc- 
tion in the competitive sector depends on the growth of employment 
more than on the growth of capital investment and technical 
17 progress.        Wages are determined by total demand for the 
product; upward surges in the wage rate are due to inflation,  but 
they do not keep in line with inflation.    Prices in this sector are 
subject to market conditions; they fall in proportion to increases 
in productivity. 
15 Ibid.,  pp.   15-16. 
16Ibid.,  pp.  20-21. 
17Ibid.,  pp.   13-15. 
18Ibid.,  p.   19. 
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The state sector is comprised of the remaining third of the 
labor force which is involved with production of goods and services 
organized by the state itself or in production organized by industries 
under contract with the state.    Growth of the state sector serves as 
a basis for the growth of the monopoly sector,  and conversely. 
This phenomenon is partly attributable to the state's attempt to 
maintain social harmony while at the same time enabling capital to 
be accumulated. 
CAUSES OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS:   A BUSINESS ANALYSIS 
With their perspectives based on such different models of 
the economy,  and with such different goals for the economy, it is 
not surprising that each of the three economists/political economists 
views the economic crisis as stemming from widely divergent 
causes.   Sommers believes that severe inflation is the result of 
several factors.   First,  he believes that economic theory has not 
been comprehensive insofar as determining the effects of economic 
stabilizers such as social security, unemployment insurance,  and 
government expenditures.   Those stabilizers have had secondary, 
unintended,  and unexpected consequences which have contributed 
20 
to inflation. 
19 Ibid., pp. 7-8 
Sommers, "I 
Policy," pp.  54-56. 
on 
nflation, Unemployment and Stabilization 
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Inflation of the past decade has also been caused in part by a 
series of what he terms inflationary accidents,  including:   the rise 
in the price of oil; the worldwide explosion of food prices; the de- 
valuation of the dollar; imposition of wage and price controls 
which ended up stimulating inflation; and advanced levels of activity 
of most major Western economies in the 1973-1974 period,  driving 
up the prices of basic industrial materials; all this coupled with the 
rapid growth of money supply in the Western world.   Sommers 
also lists the monetarist explanation of inflation -- that it is caused 
by the rapid growth of money supply in the United States.   He cites 
the fiscalist explanation as well — that inflation has been caused 
by a rapid rise in government spending,  coupled with a rapid rise 
in the public deficit. 
Most of the inflationary accidents listed by Sommers have 
political causation.   For example, the rise in the price of oil was 
the result of a political determination of the OPEC countries that 
if they acted as an economic unit rather than as individual countries, 
they could resist the pressure placed on them by their market,  the 
developed countries, to keep the price of oil,  and hence OPEC's 
21
 Ibid.,  pp. 56-57. 
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profits,  low.    Similarly,  the imposition of wage and price 
controls was a political decision which could be interpreted as 
the state's acting to maintain social order.   Other observers have 
interpreted the granting to the President of power to impose wage 
and price controls as a partisan measure which could have placed 
former-President Nixon in a precarious political position:   if he 
didn't impose controls,  he could be criticized for failure to use the 
tools available to him.    This was particularly significant with 
Nixon's second-term campaign only a year in the future at the time 
22 
when the power to impose controls was granted to him.        However 
the imposition of wage and price controls is interpreted,  the fact 
remains that it was a political decision.    Similarly,  the devaluation 
of the dollar and the rapid growth of money supply in the West also 
stem from political actions. 
Sommers believes that some of the causes of unemployment 
have little bearing on the rate of economic inflation.   In particular 
he cites the temporary phenomenon of a rapid influx of young 
workers into the labor force; the rising percentage of women 
23 
seeking employment; and discrimination in employment. 
22 Albert T. Sommers,  ed., Answers to Inflation and Recession: 
Economic Policies for a Modern Society (New York:   The Conference 
Board,   1975), p. 88. 
23 Sommers, "Inflation,  Unemployment and Stabilization 
Policy," p. 52. 
27 
Some of these phenomena also have been augmented by political 
determination.   For example, the increasing numbers of women 
seeking work outside the home is related to the enactment of 
legislation which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex; other 
legislation which provides funding for day care centers; and tax 
legislation which increases tax deductions for child care payments. 
Although Sommers believes that some of the causes of un- 
employment are independent of the rate of inflation,  he does 
believe that the evidence supports an inverse relationship between 
inflation and unemployment, that is, the relationship portrayed by 
the Phillips curve.   Sommers describes that relationship as follows: 
The Phillips curve does not demonstrate that low un- 
employment causes high inflation,  or that high un- 
employment causes the inflation rate to fall; it states 
simply that these pairs of conditions are associated 
in the historical record.   However,  it is often inter- 
preted to indicate that the available supply of labor 
influences the price of labor,  and that the price of labor 
is a major element in shaping the trend of prices in general.2** 
The Conference Board Chief Economist suggests that the evidence 
of the past ten years gives reason to believe that inflation and un- 
employment are alternating in 4-year cycles,  i.e.,  up and down 
the Phillips curve.   He does not see this 4-year fluctuation as 
being related to the 4-year presidential election cycle,  although 
24 
Ibid., p. 53. 
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others have suggested that such a correlation should be examined. 
Dr. Charles C. Holt,  Director,  Inflation and Unemployment 
Research,   with the Urban Institute,  has suggested that there is a 
correlation between the business-cycle and the election cycle in 
other countries.   He also observed that the 1972 election is a 
good example of over-stimulation of the economy for political 
*    
25 
ends. 
Sommers believes that the Phillips curve seems to be 
drifting upward,  that is,  for any given level of inflation, there 
2 fi 
exists more unemployment than there was ten years ago.        He 
would attribute this upward drift,  in part, to the rise in social 
demands and pressures,  without identifying the role of the political 
in accommodating such demands. 
Taken together,  the growth of the resource-using programs 
and the transfers programs augment the pressures of 
government and of the consumer on the available supply, 
and tend to constrict the supply available to the private 
investment sector.    In late stages of the 1972-1973 ex- 
pansion, business borrowed violently in order to augment 
its bids for its necessary supply; while the emerging 
scarcities provided an environment in which prices rose 
rapidly. 
25 Sommers, Answers to Inflation and Recession, p. 144. 
2 fi Sommers,  "Inflation,  Unemployment and Stabilization 
Policy," p.  53. 
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Finally, the United States system has gradually come 
to accept a commitment to "high employment," as have 
all major developed nations.    The commitment recognizes 
and expresses the determination of modern societies to 
provide jobs for all those who seek them.   It carries the 
suggestion that a job is a right conferred by membership 
in the society; and it may well be that in societies as com- 
plex as the United States and comparably developed 
economies,  social and economic conditions,  as much as 
the skills and industry of the individual,  control the like- 
lihood of employment.   In any event, the presence of the 
full-employment commitment makes modern societies, 
and modern labor forces,"more impatient with recession 
and unemployment,  and less tolerant, therefore,  of the 
underside of the business cycle than they used to be in a 
less socially committed area. 
More importantly,  perhaps, the full-employment commit- 
ment (and its associated mechanism of unemployment 
insurance) greatly reduces the weight of unemployment in 
wage determination,  and imparts an inflationary bias to 
wage outcomes.   Monetarists argue that this bias would not 
find expression in wage outcomes if it were not underwritten 
by expansionary monetary policy; that is,  under conditions 
of a relatively stable money supply, wage increases would 
be self-limiting because they would produce unemployment. 
But this argues, rather circularly,  that the inflationary 
effects of the commitment to full employment can be re- 
strained by violating the commitment.   A practical view of 
the history of the past decade is that the appearance of un- 
employment leads to a response of both monetary and fiscal 
policy,  and the more unemployment,  the greater the response. 
In effect,  policy "validates" the cost inflation,  directing it 
toward price inflation and away from unemployment.^ ' 
CAUSES OF INFLATION AND RECESSION:   A REFORMIST ANALYSIS 
Sommers' somewhat piecemeal explanation of the causes of un- 
employment coupled with inflation stand in marked contrast to the 
27      ' Ibid.,  p.  56. 
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comprehensive simplicity of Galbraith's analysis.    The con- 
troversial economist believes that inflation, which he describes 
as an enduring increase in prices,  is caused by the rise of the 
planning system, plus the associated appearance of large labor 
28 
unions.        He attributes the cause of what he terms systemic 
inflation to the interaction of prices and wages within the planning 
system.   This is due in large measure to the fact that the traditional 
methods of controlling inflation have little impact on the planning 
system.   For example, the reduction of government expenditures 
generally does not have a major impact on the planning system, 
since purchases of goods and services from these firms in the 
planning system usually "can't" be reduced very much,   since they 
involve areas such as national security.   Another traditional in- 
flation-controlling measure,  increasing interest rates,  also has 
minimal effect on the planning system,  according to Galbraith, 
since the planning system has generally reduced its dependence on 
borrowed funds by relying on its own earnings.   Increasing taxes 
is another traditional method of controlling inflation; again,  such   . 
action has little effect on the planning system,   since firms in that 
system have a large degree of control over their own prices, 
allowing them to pass increased taxes on to the customer. 
28Galbraith, p. 189. 
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In contrast to the minimal effect which such measures have 
on the planning system,  the effects on the market system are 
correspondingly more severe.   For example,  cuts in government 
spending generally cause cuts in welfare,  housing,  education, 
urban services,   etc. - some of which are supplied by the market 
system and some of which are provided by the civilian portion of 
the public sector.   Increases in the interest rates hurt the market 
system, which relies heavily on borrowed funds.   Increased taxes 
decrease the profits of the market system,   since prices are set by 
2 Q 
market conditions,  not by the firms. 
Galbraith feels that the existence of the planning system 
prevents the economy from being self-correcting,  as the neo- 
classical model posits.   He believes the neoclassical theory holds 
within the market system, but only in isolation from the operations 
of the planning system.   If demand drops, prices fall in the 
market system,  and unemployment occurs for a short period of 
time; but since wages can be and usually are cut,  the consumption 
to savings ratio increases,  demand rises,  and the unemployment 
drops in the market system.    Thus the self-correction of the 
system takes place.    The same is not the case,  however,  in the 
planning system.   If insufficient demand occurs,  then inventories 
29Ibid., pp.  191-194. 
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will rise, orders will fall, production will decrease, and 
unemployment will go up.    The difference in the response of 
the two systems is attributable to the fact that in the planning 
system, which has control over its prices to a large extent, 
prices don't fall when demand does; wages can't fall due to union 
30 
agreements; demand stays low; and unemployment endures. 
Galbraith contends that since the market system operates 
in the same context as the planning system, unemployment in the 
planning system affects the market system as well.   A recession 
in the planning system leads to a fall in demand for the market 
system's goods and services, which leads people in the market 
system - many more are employed in the market system than in 
the planning system - to lend political support for government 
intervention in the economy.   Such intervention generally takes 
the form of government expenditures for planning system 
31 products.        There is also a ripple effect of unemployment in the 
market system.   Unemployment in the planning system tends to 
increase unemployment in the market system as well,  since those 
jobless from the planning system search for work in the market 
system as well as in the planning system. 
30Ibid., pp. 181-183. 
3iIbid., p.  184. 
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CAUSES OF INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT: 
A RADICAL ANALYSIS 
O'Connor views the causes of inflation and unemployment 
differently.   He believes that permanent inflation is a side- 
effect of the fact that "most gains from productivity increases 
arising from technical progress . .. are not distributed evenly 
throughout the population, but rather are ' bottled up' in the 
32 
monopoly sector by corporations and organized labor." 
Inflation, that is, wages and prices continually moving upward, 
would be mitigated if productivity gains were evenly distributed 
through lowered prices.    O'Connor attributes wage inflation in 
the state sector, where productivity gains are minimal,  to the 
following: 
The state sector expands because state agencies and 
contractors must supply social capital to the monopoly 
sector and because monopoly sector growth in turn re- 
quires that the state devote even more funds to social 
expenses.    Costs of expanding state agencies and pro- 
grams increase rapidly for two reasons:   first, pro- 
ductivity increases are relatively small and thus a rising 
portion of the total productive forces must flow into the 
state sector to maintain a constant level of state services 
per unit of growing outputs.   Second, wages are relatively 
high and increase relatively rapidly.   Wages are high 
because many if not most state services require a skilled 
and experienced labor force.   And wages increase rapidly 
O'Connor,  p. 21. 
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because state sector rates tend to be tied to monopoly 
sector productivity. 
He also attributes a portion of inflation to the fact that 
occasionally; when particular state expenditures like distant 
wars become unpopular, the state resorts to inflationary finance 
34 
rather than raise taxes.        He believes that the cost-push theory 
of inflation is correct in the sense that the effect of inflation on 
living standards forces monopoly sector workers to demand 
higher wages, which leads to more inflationary pressure. 
Unemployment results when the monopoly sector introduces labor- 
saving methods in order to protect profits.   Such action pushes 
additional workers into the competitive sector or into dependence 
35 
on the state. 
Underlying these causes of inflation and unemployment is 
what O'Connor considers to be the root cause - that the capital- 
istic state must try to have social harmony while making capital 
accumulation possible.   In his opinion, the stability of the U.S. 
society has depended on three things: 
33Ibid., p. 30. 
Ibid.,  p. 43. 
Ibid.,  pp.  45-46. 
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economic expansion overseas and worldwide economic 
hegemony; the maintenance of harmonious production 
relations in the monopoly sector; and the socialization 
of monopoly sector production costs and expenses,  to- 
gether with the private appropriation of profits and the 
absence of socialization of wage payments.   All of those 
conditions are closely related and each has proved to be 
inflationary.   In a nutshell,  stability has required con- 
tinuing fiscal crisis (or "inflation" of the state budget). 
O'Connor believes that the U.S. monopoly sector needs 
foreign markets in order to keep demand at the level of its 
productive capacity; he cites as evidence the transformation of 
37 
many many corporations into multinationals.        The need for 
foreign markets gave added support for the military-industrial 
complex, which not only relies upon the U.S. Department of 
Defense as a market for its products, but also influenced U.S. 
foreign policy to seek to expand and maintain its foreign markets, 
according to O'Connor's interpretation.    Both such actions have 
proved to be inflationary.   Part of the inflation arises from the 
low productivity of the monopoly sector; this stems from the 
lack of incentive for cost control and from the "one-of-a-kind" 
38 
contracts given by the government for defense.        In addition, 
Ibid., p. 46. 
Ibid.,  p.  152. 
38 Ibid.,  pp.  150-158. 
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O'Connor believes that the government used inflation as a means 
of financing the war in Southeast Asia, rather than attempt to 
tax the people and thereby further inflame the protest over 
39 that unpopular war.        Thus he feels that in the past moderate 
inflation has been required to maintain social harmony.   However, 
O'Connor believes that the fiscal crisis of the state and the rate 
of inflation have now reached such mammoth levels that controlling 
the inflation rate is now required for social stability.    This 
critical dilemma is summarized this way: 
On the one hand, monopoly industries must grant 
increases in money wages to avoid a rupture in rela- 
tions with labor,  even though unit labor costs and 
prices continuously rise.   On the other,  domestic inflation 
worsens the fiscal crisis and tends to reduce foreign 
demand for U.S. products,  cutting into exports and 
worsening the balance of trade. ^^ 
SOLUTIONS TO THE CRISIS:   A BUSINESS APPROACH 
With such diversity of analysis as to the root cause of 
the economic crisis,  it is no wonder that consideration of solutions 
to the problem produces a wide range of options,  from doing 
nothing and seeing if the system will "right" itself; to basing 
economic policy on a revised model of the economy; to the 
creation of a social-industrial complex; to the abolition of 
capitalism. 
39Ibid., p. 47. 
Ibid. 
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Sommers claims that it is clear that there is no one 
simple solution,  or even many complex solutions.   He believes 
that,  practically speaking,  the goal should be to manage those 
problems rather than attempt to solve them.   He cautions that 
"the options open are . .. necessarily of an evolutionary,  develop- 
mental character; proposals for sudden,  dramatic or violent 
alteration, whatever their merit,  may be simply unlegislatable 
in an American context." 
Sommers himself does not support the option held by some 
in the business community, that is,  to do nothing and let the 
system "right" itself.   While he does consider this a defensible 
position, he feels that inaction now could prove very costly later. 
Action should be taken now,  before another inflationary boom 
gathers its energy and collides with our national economic policies 
to produce even worse unemployment effects than we have 
42 
experienced during the last decade. 
Sommers arrays a whole grocery list of options which are 
available in the areas of fiscal policy,  monetary policy,  labor 
relations,  and other legislative options.   He believes that: 
Sommers, "inflation,  Unemployment and Stabilization 
Policy," p. 57. 
42Ibid. 
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Many of the significant options open to us affect the 
critical interface between government and the private 
sector, where private efficiency confronts public 
values.   And most of the other options affect the 
interface between labor and management, where shares 
of income are determined.   Imperfections and anach- 
ronisms in these interfaces seem to be responsible 
for much of our recent cyclical experience of both in- 
flation and unemployment.    They are where improve- 
ment must be sought.   But the interfaces are also the 
territorial boundaries of ideologies,  and any move- 
ment of them can be interpreted as an invasion.   Our 
progress thus seems to depend on a suppression of 
ideological fervor — a truce to permit pragmatic in- 
novation and evolutionary change. 
Some of the fiscal options which Sommers lists include: 
requiring that the budget process tie government spending to 
some percent of aggregate output; using government spending as 
a means of guaranteeing full employment (this option would almost 
certainly lead to high inflation unless accompanied by other policies 
to deter this effect,  according to Sommers); and by possibly making 
the debt limits less easily revisable. 
Options for revision of tax policy include:   enlarging the 
discretionary power of the Executive branch to raise or lower 
tax rates within a range set by Congress; indexing the rates of the 
personal income tax to decrease the effect of inflationary rises in 
income placing people in higher tax brackets without their having 
43Ibid., p.  64. 
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received a real increase in spending power; and instituting more 
indirect taxes such a a value-added tax,  which would give some 
incentive for saving,  and hence prove to be anti-inflationary.   With 
respect to monetary policy,  he raises the question as to whether 
the Federal Reserve Board's policies should be coordinated more 
closely with the goals of Congress and the Executive. 
Possibilities for revising labor market institutions include: 
establishment of some type of wage and price guidelines/controls; 
more aggressive enforcement of antitrust laws; and abandonment 
of the minimum wage.   Sommers believes that the political 
feasibility of the latter option is quite low,  and himself questions 
how efficatious such an action would be in the mitigation of a 
crisis such as the country is now faced with.   Other legislative 
options which Sommers suggests might be examined include: 
public ownership of certain "needed" industries - for example, 
railroads; a combination of public and private business, which 
would utilize the government's access to capital and private 
industry' s efficiency of operation; and finally,  the option of 
.'     ,
44 
national aggregate economic planning. 
44Ibid.,  pp.  58-64. 
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Sommers does not offer a comprehensive solution to the 
economic crisis.   In one sense he does not seem to offer much 
hope that the crisis can be solved.   He believes that options 
such as those listed above should be explored in order to find a 
way to manage the crisis -- to weather out the storm.   He stresses 
the need for evolutionary change, not radical alteration of the 
system.   Although he does not state it explicitly,   one cannot help 
but wonder whether he considers some of the options he listed as 
bandaids which will help maintain political stability while the system 
evolves.    The problem is that he offers no model toward which the 
system should evolve.    Thus it appears that one is being asked to 
have faith that evolutionary change will be for the public good - that 
progress will be better for all concerned.   Both Galbraith and 
O'Connor question whether such faith is warranted.   Their solutions 
to the current economic crisis are quite different from Sommers' 
options. 
SOLUTIONS TO THE CRISIS:   A REFORMIST APPROACH 
Galbraith believes that the place for reform to begin is with 
the emancipation of belief — that is,  that a substitute is needed for 
45 
the neoclassical model.        The next step in reform would be to free 
45 Galbraith, p. 230. 
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46 the state from the strong influence of the planning system. 
Galbraith asserts that the state needs to:   enhance the power and 
47 
competence of the market system (health, housing,  etc.); 
redefine policy to discipline the planning system so that it serves 
the public purpose, through measures to regulate pollution and 
to eliminate government expenditures which don't serve the public 
48 purpose but only foster the growth of the planning system; 
manage the economy — or rather,  the two economies of the 
49 planning system and the market system;      offset and hopefully 
overcome the tendency to inequality between the planning and 
market systems by adopting measures to directly enhance the 
equality of return to firms in each system; and take steps to 
"eliminate the systenically... inflationary tendencies of the 
planning system.    These must not,  as in the past, be a source of 
added power for the planning system.    They must not   dis- 
criminate against the market system.   And they must be consistent 
with greater equality in income distribution as between the two 
systems." 
46Ibid., p. 241. 
47Ibid., p. 250. 
48Ibid., p. 251. 
49Ibid.,  pp. 221-222. 
50Ibid.,  p. 251. 
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Galbraith outlines specific reform measures which need 
to be undertaken with respect to the market system.   First,  he 
would provide a general exemption from antitrust prohibitions 
against combination with the intent of stabilizing wages and 
prices for all small businesses,  i.e.,  those classified as part 
of the market system.   He would also provide for direct govern- 
ment regulation of all prices and production therein.   He would 
encourage the development of strong labor unions in the market 
system, and push for a large increase in the minimum wage.   He 
also recommends   tariff protection for commodities of the 
market system.   He would provide government support for the 
technological,  capital, and educational needs of the market 
system.   And finally,  he would provide a guaranteed or alter- 
51 
native income for those who are unable to find employment. 
There are also specific reform measures which Galbraith 
feels are needed for the planning system.   He views the differentials 
in compensation as well as the level of wages as issues which 
should be raised in collective bargaining.    Tax policy should aim 
for greater equality within the planning system,  as should wage 
and price policy.   He states that "the ultimate structure of the 
51Ibid..  pp. 256-262. 
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firm should be one in which compensation differentials are 
, .t52. greatly narrowed. 
In addition to these specific reform measures for each 
system,  Galbraith outlines some measures to be undertaken for 
general reform.   Government expenditures should be related to the 
public purpose, not the planning system's benefit.   After the needs 
of the public are determined,  taxes should be set accordingly. 
In his view, taxes should be strongly progressive, both corporate 
and personal income taxes.   Because he believes that the chief 
cause of the economic crisis is uneven development of the market 
and planning system,  he contends that the taxes which best serve 
the public goal of greater equality are those which are most 
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efficient in achieving stabilization.        He would advocate a reduction 
in the use of monetary policy for reducing the economic crisis, 
since he believes that: 
Those who least need to borrow and those who are most 
favored as borrowers are in the planning system.    The 
planning system is the most highly developed part of 
the economy, the market system the least developed. 
Monetary policy thus favors the strongest and most 
developed part of the economy,  discriminates against 
the weakest and least developed part. 
52Ibid., p. 266. 
53 Ibid., pp.  305-306, 
Ibid., p.  308. 
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Finally,  Galbraith would impose wage and price controls in the 
planning system only.   He does not believe that such action would 
necessarily freeze wages and prices at present levels; rather, he 
feels that increases in wages should be roughly equivalent to the 
average productivity gain within the planning system.   Similarly, 
the average price of a given product should be fixed, but not the 
prices of individual products for a particular firm.    The goal of 
the wage controls for the planning system should be to narrow the 
income differentials, both within the planning system and between 
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the planning and market systems. 
SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS:   A RADICAL APPROA CH 
O1 Connor views solution of the economic crisis in yet another 
way.    Theoretically, he states that there are three methods for 
a state to ameliorate inflation and the fiscal crisis:   a managed 
recession, wage and price controls,  or increased productivity. 
In his analysis, neither of the first two are viable solutions, for 
reasons which will be enumerated later.    Improved productivity 
in the state and monopoly sectors is the only practical long-run 
option available to the state,  apart from socialism,  in O'Connor's 
view.    Improved productivity in the monopoly sector would help to 
restrain prices and .increase production and profits.   Increased 
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productivity in the state sector would help ease the strain on the 
state budget.   He holds little hope for productivity increases in 
the competitive sector,  due to the small scale of production,  the 
quantity of firms involved,  and the lack of coordination within the 
sector.   Even the monopoly sector provides a challenge for in- 
creasing productivity,   since he feels that direct intervention by 
the state is only acceptable in times of national emergency,  e.g., 
wartime.    Thus O'Connor believes that the state will be compelled 
to use indirect methods to increase productivity in the monopoly 
sector; the only place where productivity can be increased directly 
is in the state sector—a place where improvement is difficult to 
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accomplish and even more difficult to measure.        He holds out 
* 
more hope for indirect improvement of productivity in the monopoly 
sector. 
Such productivity increases in the monopoly sector would best 
be accomplished through the development of what he terms the 
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"social-industrial complex."        Such a development would require 
certain political changes:   monopoly capital would have to estab- 
lish new (and strengthen existing) ties with the state; the 
competitive sector's influence (both in the market and politically) 
560'Connor,  p.  51. 
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would have to be weakened; and monopoly capital must build new 
alliances with organized labor to ensure that workers won't be 
harmed by (and therefore resist) the growth of the social- 
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   „ industrial complex. In short,  the success of the social- 
industrial complex requires that gains from technical progress be 
redistributed; they must devolve to monopoly capital and com- 
petitive sector workers,  not to monopoly and state sector 
, ,.59 
workers. 
O'Connor describes the social-industrial complex as follows: 
i     Politically, the complex consists of the slowly evolving 
*       alliance between sections of monopoly capital and the 
surplus population, together with low-paid monopoly 
sector labor.   Economically,  the complex consists of 
the transformation of social expenses into social capital 
by mounting socioeconomic programs both to provide 
new subsidized investment opportunities for monopoly 
capital and to ameliorate the material impoverishment 
of the surplus population.   Sociologically,  the complex 
consists of the creation of a new stratum of indirectly 
productive workers -- the small army of technologists, 
administrators, paraprofessionals,  factory and office 
workers,  and others who plan,  implement,  and control 
the new programs in education,  health,  housing,   science, 
and other spheres penetrated by social-industrial capital. 
CO 
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O1 Connor believes that the social-industrial complex could 
succeed because its development might make each dollar spent 
by the government more efficient in the sense that it would help 
increase economic production, thus broadening the tax base and 
hence increase the state's income.   Viewing the possibilities of 
the development of such a complex in a realistic manner,  O'Connor 
notes that the competitive sector has little to gain from such a 
development; organized labor has little or nothing to gain; and 
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the military-industrial complex seems to be ambivalent.        Thus 
he does not view the development of a social-industrial complex 
as a distinct possibility,  given the groups which would not benefit. 
His major contention is that: 
Finally, in the absence of a socialist perspective that 
puts forth alternatives to every facet of capitalist 
society and that can help people comprehend every 
issue from the class nature of budgetary control to the 
nature of tax exploitation to the process by which the 
use of technology and science are decided, unionists, 
organizers,  and activists will continue to function in 
a relative theoretical vacuum.   Precisely because we 
live at a time when all strata of the working class relate 
to each other more and more politically (and at a time 
when ultimate contradiction is the use of political or 
social means to achieve individual ends), what is needed 
is a socialist perspective that seeks to redefine needs 
in collective terms. 
61Ibid.,  pp. 221-222. 
62Ibid., p. 255. 
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That is, while O'Connor considers the development of the social- 
industrial complex as an option which could possibly extend the 
life of the current capitalistic system,  he believes that ultimately 
the economic crisis will resurface,  perhaps in a different form. 
Thus from O'Connor's perspective,  the only comprehensive,  long- 
term solution to the economic crisis is socialism. 
COUNTERARGUMENTS TO PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
This chapter has reviewed three different perspectives on the 
U.S. economic crisis of the 1965 to 1975 period.    The analyses, 
root causes,  and solutions to the crisis have proved to be quite 
different.   One other aspect of the perspectives should be consider- 
ed -- that is, how each critic views the proposed solutions offered 
by the other two.   Such a comparison is not meant to exhaust all 
possible combinations of critics and solutions,  but is rather de- 
signed to give the flavor of a debate or panel discussion among the 
three political economists. 
Earlier it was mentioned that Sommers believes that one 
possible solution would be more rigorous enforcement of anti- 
trust laws.   From Galbraith's perspective,   such action would be 
counterproductive.   If the antitrust laws' enforcement produced 
the desired result of stimulating competition,  Galbraith points 
out that this would only result in greater expansion of the industry 
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against which the antitrust suit was filed.   Since the planning system 
exerts a fair amount of control over its own prices, the increased 
activity of that particular industry would not lower prices,  a primary 
goal of increasing competition,  and greater development of the 
planning sector would result.    This is precisely what Galbraith 
has identified as being the root cause of the crisis:   uneven devel- 
' opment between the market and planning systems.    Thus Galbraith 
believes that vigorous antitrust enforcement would exacerbate the 
63 present economic crisis.        Sommers argues that most businesses 
say that they don't have appreciable power in the selling markets. 
They credit -- at least in part -- this minimum power over selling 
prices to the antitrust laws.   Sommers himself doesn't believe that 
antitrust enforcement would completely solve the crisis, particularly 
in the context of a commitment to full employment.    Unless the full 
employment commitment is abandoned or ignored,  Sommers 
believes that even fully competitive industries will'pass on all 
cost increases affecting the entire industry,  with no fear of 
pricing themselves out of the market.    Thus antitrust enforcement 
would only mitigate the crisis if coupled with other less popular 
64 
actions. 
63 Galbraith,  pp. 216-217. 
64 Sommers,  "Inflation,   Unemployment and Stabilization 
Policy," p.  62. 
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Another option considered by Sommers is the adoption of wage 
and price controls.   Galbraith believes that wage and price 
controls should be imposed only on the planning sector.   Such 
controls would not necessarily freeze wages and prices, but would 
rather tie them to increases in productivity averaged over the 
planning system.   O'Connor argues that imposing controls on the 
monopoly sector or on any industry in which wages rise more 
rapidly than productivity really operates to the advantage of 
monopoly capital,  since the burden of keeping wages down shifts 
to the government.   He also believes that such controls aid the 
monopoly sector in that they reduce the risk of a downturn in 
employment,  income, production,  and finally profits.   From the 
state sector' s point of view,  controls are advantageous in that the 
race of state wages to keep up with monopoly sector wages will be 
slowed.   However,  since organized labor hates controls,  O'Connor 
thinks that the major disadvantage of wage and price controls from 
the standpoint of the existing system is that it offers an opportunity 
for the development of class consciousness—alliances between 
workers in the monopoly and competitive sectors against the state, 
rather than having conflicts between labor and capital,  as is now 
the case.   O'Connor feels that this potential disadvantage outweighs 
all the advantages, thus limiting the application of wage and price 
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controls as a viable solution for preserving capitalistic society. 
O'Connor believes that a socialist perspective is the only 
lasting solution to the current U.S. economic crisis.   Galbraith 
disagrees to the extent that he believes that the state must be 
emancipated from the control of the planning system before public 
ownership could even be considered as a viable option.   He offers 
this contention based on the idea that the planning system's source 
of power is organization and technical expertise. 
According to Galbraith: 
Goals may differ.   A public organization will not need 
a minimum level of earnings to protect its autonomy. 
Technological virtuosity for its own sake may-be more 
important than growth.   But it will not be less concerned 
with pursuing goals important to its members than the 
private organization.   Nor will there be any greater 
certainty that these goals will accord with public purpose. 
In recent times there has been at least as much complaint 
about the indifference of the Atomic Energy Commission 
to public interest as that of General Motors. 
Galbraith is not totally against public ownership,  however.   He 
feels that the case for full public ownership becomes stronger 
after the state is broken free of the planning system.   He also 
believes that public ownership is almost indispensible in parts 
of the market system "where inability to deploy power and to 
65OrConnor,  p.  50. 
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Galbraith, pp. 219-220. 
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*   * 
command resources is the problem.' Interestingly,  Sommers 
does not inveigh against public ownership as might be expected. 
He suggests that although there appears to be an American con- 
sensus against what he terms substantial public ownership of 
private facilities, perhaps this is one place where American 
CO 
attitudes need to be reexamined. DO   Galbraith would probably view 
this suggestion as substantiation of his contention that the state 
needs to be emancipated from control by the planning sector, 
since an eminent business economist such as Sommers would 
probably not suggest such an unorthodox solution if adoption 
would be detrimental to the interest which he represents.   In the 
same vein,  O'Connor would view such a proposal as the next 
logical step in the rise of state capital-ism.   Neither Galbraith nor 
O'Connor would view Sommers' proposal as a step toward 
socialism; rather they would probably interpret his suggestion as 
another means by which,  in Galbraith's words, the state would be 
made to serve the private,  rather than the public purpose. 
Sommers would argue that public goals are being foisted upon 
private industry,  and that if public goals are to be served,  then 
67 
Ibid., p. 220. 
CO 
Sommers, "Inflation,  Unemployment and Stabilization 
Policy," p. 63. 
53 
some modification of private ownership is perhaps necessary 
to preserve the vigor of the economy as a whole (within the 
context of the free enterprise system).   He argues that the current 
conflict between "social goals and private means is painfully 
evident in the multiplication of government agencies to foster the 
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achievement of the goal indirectly." Thus Sommers would 
argue for limited government ownership of productive facilities 
if public goals are to be achieved; Galbraith would argue against 
such a development unless the state were freed from the influence 
of the planning system; and O'Connor would oppose any solution 
apart from complete public ownership as a perpetuation of the 
trend which he believes only exacerbates the fiscal crisis on the 
state. 
Sommers believes that the search to solve the economic crisis 
should not seek to obliterate the business cycle itself.   He regards 
the fluctuation of the free market economy as healthy.   He cites 
the historical record as evidence that the business cycle itself is 
not solely dependent on inflationary pressures for its energy, but 
rather as a phenomenon which occurs even during stable price 
periods and declining price intervals.   He adopts the traditional 
view of the business cycle as a necessary evil: 
Ibid. 
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A degree of fluctuation in the system acts to free and 
reengage resources — of capital and of labor — 
releasing them from inefficient or uneconomic application, 
and then moving them to more efficient,  more economic 
uses.    This is not to say that there are no discomforts 
associated with this ordinary business cycle fluctuation; 
there is some destruction of financial wealth and some 
loss of real output in the course of even a modest re- 
cession,  and more importantly, there are the human 
costs of unemployment.   But in return for the cruelties 
to individual owners and workers, the system as a whole 
reaps a reward in vigor,  efficiency,  and long term growth 
of living standards. 
This trade-off of short-term discomfort   for some against 
longer-term improvement for all may not be perfectly 
satisfactory, but the cost to the system of obliterating 
the mixed blessings of the ordinary business cycle is 
generally thought of as rather high — in terms of inter- 
vention within the structure of the system to stabilize 
its internal relationships; in terms of the consequent 
concentration of power in government; and, perhaps, 
also in terms of losses of personal freedom.   All Western 
economies face this structural (and philosophical) trade-off. 
The greater the effort to stabilize the natural cycle, the 
more interventions of government,  the more discretionary 
power required by government and (some would argue) the 
less the long-term vigor.   ■ 
O'Connor does not overtly state that an economy operating under 
a socialist perspective would eliminate the business cycle, but 
he does criticize the managed recession as a solution to the 
economic crisis.   He believes that with the state's commitment to 
legitimization as well as accumulation,  it cannot afford to permit 
or engineer recessions to maintain economic health.   His argument 
runs as follows: 
70Ibid., p. 54. 
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The first option open to the state is to use fiscal 
and monetary policy to reduce aggregate demand, 
increase unemployment,  and weaken unions in the 
monopoly and state sectors.   Assuming that labor's 
bargaining power is effectively reduced, the positive 
result of managed recession from the standpoint of 
capital and the government is to reduce the rate of in- 
crease of money wages (and potentially unit labor costs) 
and interest rates,  and indirectly to slow down the growth 
of price inflation.   But there are negative effects.   One is 
the reduction of aggregate demand and sales which creates 
unused productive capacity.    This tends to reduce labor 
productivity and raise unit labor costs, which produces 
a special kind of cost-push inflation.   Another negative 
effect is to increase unemployment and underemployment 
and thus the number of people dependent on the state 
budget.   Managed recession simultaneously reduces 
aggregate wage and profit income, lowers the tax base, 
and cuts into tax receipts, which squeezes the budget 
from the revenue side. 
O'Connor sees the managed recession as contributing to the 
fiscal crisis of the state.   Sommers would say that this is true 
only in the context of a full employment commitment.   O'Connor 
would return that that is the only context in which any method should 
be considered. 
Finally,  it is instructive to consider briefly the views of 
each political economist on the subject of national economic 
planning.   This topic will be examined in greater depth in the 
next chapter, but a brief look at each man's opinion will be 
included here for completeness. 
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Sommers contends that aggregate economic planning would 
be a highly educational exercise. However, he feels that while 
"an intensified effort at planning is certainly a reasonable 
option,   . . . both the hopes and fears raised by the term may be 
172 
exaggerated by ideological rhetoric." 
Galbraith is convinced of the need for national coordination. 
So long as there is private planning, he believes there will be a 
need for public planning.    However, he cautions that it will be most 
difficult to foster planning which serves the public,  rather than the 
73 
private planning system's purpose. 
O'Connor states that the development of a social-industrial 
complex will "require rryuch more economic and social planning in 
transportation, urban development,   education,  and other spheres 
— precisely the kind of planning that monopoly capital (especially 
in technology-intensive growth industries) is capable of and that 
small-scale business abhors." 
Sommers, "Inflation,  Unemployment add Stabilization 
Policy," p.  64. 
73 Galbraith, pp.  318-319. 
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Thus we see that regardless of their perspective on the 
root cause(s) of the economic crisis,  these three political econo- 
mists view national economic planning as an option which should 
be considered.    The next chapter will deal with this option in 
greater depth. 
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CHAPTER 2:   WILL NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING HELP 
SOLVE THE U.S. ECONOMIC CRISIS? 
In order to test the proposition that national economic planning 
(NEP) could help solve the U.S. economic crisis,  it is necessary 
to consider whether NEP will help in achieving the goals which 
various theorists feel that the political economy should achieve: 
1. National economic planning will enable the inflation rate 
to be reduced to a manageable level while unemployment 
is also being reduced; 
2. National economic planning will change the structural 
inequities underlying the economy; for example, it will 
change the wide disparity in levels of income,  and the 
unequal distribution of wealth; 
3. National economic planning will slow the tendency of 
government spending to outrun revenues; 
4. National economic planning will provide a holistic 
approach to national policy-making - an approach which 
is necessary since the U.S. must learn to live as part of 
an interdependent world. 
National economic planning is a concept which has a variety of 
definitions and connotations.   As Herbert Stein, Professor of 
Economics at the University of Virginia, has noted: 
Careful consideration of the proposals for more economic 
planning is made almost impossibly difficult by the lack of 
any precise and agreed meaning for the term "economic 
planning."   Its opponents sometimes talk as if it means 
converting the United States into the Gulag Archipelago.   Its 
supporters sometimes seem to mean that the American 
economy should be run like a progressive kindergarten,  in 
which the pupils reach a consensus each morning on what 
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they will do that day - who will pour the lemonade and who 
will serve the cookies.   But the first interpretation is not 
inevitable and the second is not possible. *■ 
Stein goes on to consider a variety of possible definitions of planning, 
as compiled by Vera Lutz in her book,  Central Planning for the 
Market Economy. 
Any discussion of compartive economic systems must 
keep in mind that the terms "central economic planning" and 
"planned economy" have both in recent times been applied to 
differing concepts which still need to be kept apart.    The first 
term,   sometimes replaced by the second,  is used to refer to 
three distinct things: 
a:     a system of integral planning from the centre, 
implying that all economic operations are centrally 
"guided," "coordinated," or "directed" by a "National 
Plan"; 
b. a system of partial planning from the centre,  entailing 
measures of government intervention for purposes of 
modifying specific aspects of the pattern of production, 
consumption,  or distribution; 
c. the government's programme for the public sector of 
the economy,   or what M. Masse calls the "Plan of the 
State" as distinct from the "National Plan" of which it 
would constitute only a part. 
The second term is used in still a further sense: 
d. to denote that every economy is "planned" in the sense 
that the various economic agents (government departments, 
local authorities, public enterprises, private firms, 
households,   etc.) almost all engage individually in some 
sort of forward planning or "programming" of their 
activities. 
*A. Lawrence Chickering,   ed.,   The Politics of Planning 
(San Francisco:   Institute for Contemporary Studies,   1976), p. 20. 
2Ibid.,  p. 22. 
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This paper will consider national economic planning in the 
sense of definition (a), that is, national economic planning will 
be considered as a centrally-guided system of planning for the 
entire economy. 
This chapter will first examine the ability of centrally- 
guided NEP to reduce inflation and unemployment simultaneously. 
Chapter one listed a number of possible contributory factors to 
the simultaneous inflation and unemployment experienced in the 
past decade,  including:   rising demands for social and distributive 
justice; failure of current economic theory to identify secondary 
effects of economic stabilizers such as social security and 
unemployment compensation; worldwide rise in the prices of oil 
.and food; devaluation of the dollar; wage and price controls; uneven 
development of two different parts of the economy - the planning 
system and the market system; failure to distribute productivity 
gains evenly throughout the economy; and the increasing number of 
workers who are dependent on the state. 
Of this list of possible contributory factors to the economic 
crisis,  only one can be considered as being essentially economic - 
the failure of economic theory to identify the secondary effects of 
economic stabilizers such as unemployment compensation and1 
social security,  although these measures themselves were instituted 
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for political reasons.    Thus it seems important to consider the 
political aspects of national economic planning when attempting 
to assess whether NEP will help achieve certain goals set for the 
economy. 
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING. 
Buchanan and Tullock,  of Virginia Polytechnic Institute's 
Center for Public Choice,  argue that a change in bureaucratic 
structure (for example, the establishment of an Economic 
Planning Board) will not change the political interests which now 
oppose many of the changes advocated by those who support 
national economic planning as a means of achieving their goals 
for the political economy.   Buchanan and Tullock also question the 
assumption made by many supporters of national economic planning 
that ignorance is preventing the achievement of many economic 
3 
goals.  That is, the two economists vehemently disagree with 
those who believe that if enough economic data is gathered, 
V 
organized,  disseminated,   and used as the basis of policy-making, 
then hitherto unachievable goals will be reached,  due to improved 
information.    They feel that if goals are not achieved under the 
present economic system,  it is chiefly due to political consider- 
ations; and in order to consider whether NEP is the best way to 
3Ibid., pp. 258-259. 
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attain goals not being achieved currently,  they believe it is 
necessary for overt recognition of the political aspects of 
4 
planning. 
With Buchanan and Tullock' s arguments regarding the political 
aspects of NEP as a backdrop, the next consideration is the 
question of the ability of NEP to achieve the goal of simultaneous 
reduction of inflation and unemployment. 
REDUCING INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT THROUGH 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING 
Rising demands for social justice and equity of economic 
distribution were listed as possible contributory factors to the 
currenty economic crisis.   If NEP were able to weigh and constrain 
such demands to the level and pace which the economy could 
* 
accommodate, then NEP could help reduce those portions of 
inflation and unemployment which were attributable to rising social 
demands.   For example, the commitment to full employment has 
been maintained even at a time when there is a temporary rapid 
influx of young workers into the labor force,  a rising proportion 
of women seeking employment in the marketplace,  and an attempt 
to eliminate discrimination in employment.   A national planning 
mechanism might have had the foresight to attempt to moderate 
the full employment commitment to take into account the changing 
4Ibid., p. 265. 
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composition of the labor force.   However, whether the groups 
supporting the interests of women,  minorities,  and young workers 
would have sanctioned such a modification of the full-employment 
goal is doubtful, unless guarantees were made that their particular 
interests would be protected in any modification of the full employ- 
ment commitment. 
Another contributory factor to the current bout of severe 
inflation and unemployment was the worldwide jump in the prices 
of oil and food.   It is possible that had NEP been in effect prior 
to the OPEC oil embargo,  some type of contingency plan might 
have been developed to provide directives as to what steps should 
be taken if "highly unlikely" but potentially disastrous events such 
as an oil embargo should occur,  in order to minimize the impact of 
such events on the U.S. economy. 
Wage and price controls were also listed as being contributory 
to the economic crisis.    The application of controls was made in a 
political context,   and there is no reason to believe that a national 
economic planning board would have been able to withstand the 
pressure for bringing inflation to a reasonable level prior to a 
presidential election,  only to have the inflation reoccur at a later 
time with much greater momentum. 
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Uneven development of two different segments of the 
economy — the planning system and the market system — has also 
been listed as a cause of severe inflation coupled with severe 
unemployment.   According to Galbraith's analysis, policies to 
combat the crisis would have to differentiate between the two types 
of firms.   For example,  if wage and price controls were directed 
5 
solely to the planning system,  they could help alleviate the crisis. 
National economic planning would have to prescribe differing 
policies — one set prescribed to further the development of the 
market system,  and one set designed to curb the planning system -- 
in order to reduce that portion of inflation and unemployment which 
is attributable to the planning system's developing at a faster rate 
than the market system.   Whether such differentiation of NEP 
policies is politically feasible remains questionable.   On the one 
hand,  since the planning system does not represent many votes, it 
is possible that Congress could influence NEP in a manner which 
does favor the market system over the planning system.   On the 
other hand, the power of the planning system, particularly with the 
aid of the Executive Branch,  could counterbalance its lack of people. 
One other factor which some consider as causing the rampant 
inflation and unemployment of the U.S. economy is the fact that the 
5Galbraith, p. 314. 
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state is forced to socialize more and more costs in order to 
fulfill its role of fostering social harmony, while the profits 
continue to accrue to the private sector.      One proponent of this 
view, James O1 Connor,  has argued that most of the productivity 
gains from technical advances are distributed solely to the 
monopoly sector,  rather than being distributed to the entire society 
7 
through lowered prices.     Permanent inflation is seen as resulting 
from this uneven distribution of productivity gains.   Unemployment 
is viewed as part of the larger problem of an ever-increasing 
number of workers who are dependent on the state.      Monopoly 
sector growth tends to create technological unemployment,  com- 
pelling more and more workers to seek employment in the 
9 
competitive and state sectors.      If these sectors cannot absorb the 
surplus population,  unemployment increases. 
National economic planning could possibly mitigate the 
situation if it would foster the growth of a social-industrial complex. 
O'Connor asserts that the development of the social-industrial 
6Q'Connor,  pp. 6-9. 
7Ibid.,  pp. 21-22. 
8 Ibid., pp. 45-46. 
9 
Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
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complex will require more economic and social planning. 
According to O1 Connor, 
the hoped-for long-term effect of the more rapid 
development of the social-industrial complex is an 
increase in productivity throughout the economy. 
Such growth might help alleviate the fiscal crisis 
because each dollar of government expenditure might 
be more "efficient" in the sense of adding to the economy's 
long-run productive capacity,  thus expanding total income 
and the tax base and easing the burden of financing the 
budget. * 
However,  O'Connor views the growth of the social- 
industrial complex as being - at best - a step which will merely 
extend the life of the state capitalistic system for awhile.   In 
conjunction with this view,  national economic planning will just help 
to ameliorate simultaneous inflation and unemployment for a short 
period of time, if at all.   He believes that unless national economic 
planning to reduce inflation and unemployment is done in the con- 
text of a socialist perspective, the temporary mitigation of the 
12 
crisis will reappear in a new form. 
REDUCING STRUCTURAL INEQUITIES THROUGH NATIONAL 
ECONOMIC PLANNING 
The second goal which some theorists believe the economy 
1QIbid., p. 225. 
11Ibid.J p. 221. 
32
 Ibid., p. 255. 
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should achieve is a reduction of structural inequities which 
underlie the economy,   such as wide gaps between levels of in- 
come, and the lopsided distribution of wealth.   According to 
Buchanan and Tullock' s argument,  a change in the bureaucratic 
superstructure (such as the establishment of a national economic 
planning board) will not alter the strength and efficacy of the 
political interests which now oppose changes such as redistribution 
of income.   The plausibility of such a hypothesis is supported by 
a statement by Albert Sommers,  of the business-supported 
Conference Board, when speaking of modifying the structural in- 
equities inherent in today's economy.   He believes that "the options 
open are thus necessarily of an evolutionary,  developmental 
character; proposals for sudden,  dramatic or violent alteration, 
whatever their merit,  may be simply unlegislatable in an American 
13 
context."        He says that he doesn't mean to imply that innovation 
should be ruled out completely,  but he does believe that "the 
introduction of new devices deemed to be desirable in principle must 
n 14 proceed carefully,  with frequent pragmatic checkpoints. . . . 
Sommers, "Inflation, Unemployment and Stabilization 
Policy," p. 57. 
14Ibid. 
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Galbraith concurs with Buchanan and Tullock1 s argument 
that establishment of a new bureaucratic mechanism such as 
national economic planning will not in and of itself assure that 
structural inequities of the economy will be altered.   He believes 
that unless actions are taken to free the state from the influence 
of the planning system,  national economic planning would merely 
perpetuate the planning system's influence,  disguised as the public 
15 purpose.        The corollary of this would be that the structural 
inequities would only be modified insofar as the planning system 
would profit from such modification. 
However,  Galbraith also sees that national economic planning 
does provide an opportunity for reducing structural inequities if 
the state is freed from the influence of the private planning 
system.   Should this occur,  he feels that public planning can be 
organized in such a way that it can "anticipate disparity and. .. 
ensure that growth in different parts of the economy is compatible. 
The latter on frequent occasion will require conservation — 
measures to reduce or eliminate the socially least urgent use. 
On other occasion it will require public steps to expand output." 
15GaJbraith, p. 241 
16Ibid., p. 318. 
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The measures by which inequities would be reduced under 
Galbraith's system were elaborated on in chapter 1:   measures 
which would enhance the power and competence of the market 
system; measures which would discipline the planning system in 
order to bring its actions to serve the public purpose.   Some of 
these included provision of a guaranteed or alternative income; 
tax policies which seek to achieve greater equity; and wage and 
price controls, in the planning system only.   Presumably,   such 
measures would be enacted by the legislature acting in conjunction 
with policies set forth by the national economic planning body, 
although Galbraith is not clear as to what type of body would most 
effectively accomplish such public purpose planning,   and how such 
planning would interface with existing legislative, judicial,  and 
administrative bodies. 
O'Connor's chief concern with structural inequities focuses 
on the fact that more and more social costs are born by the tax- 
payers in general while the profits accruing from such expenditures 
are privately appropriated.   If a socialist perspective were adopted, 
needs would be redefined in collective terms and national economic 
planning would as a matter of course eliminate the inequities of the 
present system.   Barring the acceptance of such a socialist 
outlook,  O' Connor sees little hope for the economy achieving the 
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goals of more even distribution of wealth and income.   If the 
social-industrial complex were to be developed,  much more 
economic and social planning would be required in the areas of 
transport,  education, and redevelopment of urban centers, in his 
view.   Although he believes that such planning would probably be 
decentralized regional planning,  his analysis of the effectiveness 
of such planning can be extended to the concept of centralized 
national planning.   He believes that corporations of the monopoly 
17 sector would dominate the plans which would be formulated; 
such action would indubitably lead to perpetuation of the economy's 
structural inequities. 
However,  O'Connor does recognize that there are efforts by 
groups such as minorities, women,  and community control move- 
ments which seek to socialize decision-making from below.   Such 
movements, he feels, will agitate for a different "distribution of 
the social product between and within the main economic classes 
18 
and the uses to which the social product is put."        Should such 
groups win the struggle for control of planning,  then the distribution 
of wealth and income would doubtlessly be altered.   Whether the 
170'Connor,  p. 227. 
18Ibid., p. 228. 
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distribution would be any more equitable remains to be seen. 
Nonetheless,  O'Connor does not hold much hope for such activity 
as effecting a lasting solution unless a socialist perspective is 
adopted,  since he believes that such activities are functioning in a 
19 theoretical vacuum. 
REDUCING GOVERNMENT SPENDING THROUGH NATIONAL 
ECONOMIC PLANNING 
The third goal which some feel the economy should achieve 
is slowing of the tendency of government spending to outrun revenues. 
One factor listed as contributing to this problem is that government 
expenditures are made in response to the wishes of the people and 
are not constrained by any budgetary criteria,  except the newly- 
created Congressionaly Budget Committees,  which have yet to have 
20 
a major impact on the economy.      If national economic planning 
would help constrain the rising demands for social and distributive 
justice to a level which the economy is able to accommodate, then 
the tendency for government spending to exceed its revenues could 
be diminished to the extent that such demands contribute to the 
problem. 
19 Ibid., p. 255. 
Sommer 
Policy," p. 58 
2 0 rs, "Inflation,  Unemployment and Stabilization 
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Another factor which contributes to the runaway- 
expenditures problem,  according to Galbraith,  is the symbiotic 
relationship which exists between the planning system and the 
government.    The planning system relies on the state for stimulation 
of demand,  supply of educated manpower,  and supply of the infra- 
structure (e.g.,  communications,  transportation,  etc.).   Without 
government intervention, the planning system is inherently unstable. 
The market system in isolation from the planning system does not 
have the same need for or influence over state expenditures. 
However,  government policies undertaken to help stabilize the 
planning system tend to cause more suffering (hence greater 
demand for government intervention) in the market system than in 
21 
the planning system. 
If the state is not freed from the influence of the planning 
system,  national economic planning will not control the tendency 
of government spending to outrace revenues, unless the planning 
system begins suffering as much as or more than the market 
system does from the effects of such cost overruns.   However, 
since planning system firms have tended to minimize their 
dependence on external financing and generally supply goods and 
21Galbraith, pp. 156-181. 
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services to the government which the government terms as 
22 
necessary,       it appears unlikely that the fiscal crisis of the 
state will hurt the planning system more than it helps it, implying 
that there will be no serious effort on the part of the planning 
system to control the tendency of state spending to exceed revenues. 
Thus the only way such action will occur is if the national economic 
planning system serves the public purpose rather than that of the 
private planning system. 
O'Connor focuses on the tendency for state expenditures to 
outrun revenues in his book,   The Fiscal Crisis of the State.   Since 
he believes that the fiscal crisis is caused by the inherent contra- 
diction in the two basic functions of the capitalist state 
(accumulation and legitimitization), no amount of national economic 
planning which does not address itself to the root cause of the fiscal 
crisis will be able to eradicate this tendency. 
Should a social-industrial complex develop,  O'Connor would 
probably feel that economic planning could help control the 
tendency for government spending to outrun revenues.   It would do 
this by making the dollars spent by the government more productive 
in the sense of making the monopoly sector more productive.    This 
in turn increases the revenues of the government,  thus bringing 
22Ibid., pp.  191-193, 
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the runaway expenditures under control.   Nonetheless,  he 
emphasizes that this is only an interim measure to ameliorate 
the fiscal crisis,  and that the only lasting solution to the crisis is 
23 
socialism. 
HOLISTIC POLICY-MAKING THROUGH NATIONAL 
ECONOMIC PLANNING 
The fourth goal which some economists feel should be achieved 
is provision of a holistic approach to policy-making, particularly 
insofar as it would enable the United States to live as a good global 
citizen,  as suggested by Heilbroner in The Human Prospect.   There 
is nothing inherent in national economic planning which would pre- 
clude such planning from taking place in a global context.   That is, 
there is nothing which would prevent consideration of the effect of 
the economic policies of the rest of the world on the U.S. economy, 
and/or the global ramifications of national economic plans.   On the 
other hand,  if Buchanan and Tullock' s hypothesis is correct, then 
the former is much more likely to occur than the latter.   Many 
political interests have demonstrated a concern for policy-making 
which takes into account the impact of other nations' economic 
policies.   Few pressure groups in the United States lobby for U.S. 
policies which are formulated with sensitivity to the global 
230'Connor, p. 221. 
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ramifications of such policies, particularly the effects on the 
politically powerless.   One notable exception is the pro-Israel 
group, which devotes considerable effort to acquainting policy- 
makers with the effects of their proposed policies on the state of 
Israel.   A new lobbying group with international focus has just 
been formed.   Its membership includes notables such as 
Dr. Margaret Mead.   They plan to lobby for policies which they 
24 feel are consistent with good global citizenship.        Unless more 
groups with similar goals are formed,  it seems that national 
economic planning will probably not function as a mechanism for 
enabling the United States to live with concern for the negative 
effects which some of its economic policies have on other less- 
powerful nations. 
A second aspect of holistic planning is whether national 
economic planning can be accomplished without some type of 
national social planning - either de facto   or overt.   Without a 
specific proposal for national economic planning,  it is impossible 
to say with certainty whether this aspect of the holistic planning 
goal would be accomplished,  although the very designation of 
24 Don Oberdorfer,    Group Former (sic.) to Lobby on 
International Issues," The Washington Post,  October 14,   1976, 
p. A 4. 
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planning as being economic seems to indicate that social 
planning would be_de facto, that is,  happen as a by-product of 
economic planning,  rather than overt.   This aspect of holism 
will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 3 in the context of a 
particular NEP proposal. 
Thus,  centralized national economic planning does offer 
potential for simultaneous reduction of inflation and unemployment, 
at least to the extent that the economic crisis has resulted from 
factors for which there was no significant political motivation; 
examples of such non-political factors include lack or coordination 
of economic policies,  and failure to provide adequate contingency 
planning for highly unlikely but potentially disastrous events such 
as the OPEC oil embargo.   However, unless the political power 
shifts to other interest groups,  changes in the structural inequities 
underlying the economy seem to be fairly unlikely,  despite the in- 
stitution of national economic planning.   It also seems appropriate 
to assign the same low probability of change to the goal of 
diminishing the tendency for government spending to exceed 
revenues through the establishment of NEP.   Holistic planning could 
be aided by NEP, but a determination as to its chances of being 
successful rests upon the content of specific national economic 
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planning proposals. 
The next chaper will examine a particular national 
economic planning proposal,  the Humphrey-Javits Balanced 
Growth and Economic Planning Bill,  in light of these perspectives. 
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CHAPTER 3:    WILL ENACTMENT OF S1795,   THE BALANCED 
GROWTH AND ECONOMIC PLANNING ACT, HELP 
SOLVE THE U.S. ECONOMIC CRISIS? 
In May 1975, two ranking members of the U.S. Joint Economic 
Committee introduced a bill, SI795 - The Balanced Growth and 
Economic Planning Act - which would provide a means by which 
the United States could confront and hopefully solve the economic 
crisis.   Senators Hubert Humphrey and Jacob Javits spent months 
of effort on this bill,  according to Senator Humphrey's introductory 
remarks.      Their bill would establish a democratic procedure for 
creating a long-term national economic plan.    They consider such 
a plan necessary because they recognize that the United States is 
faced with its worst economic decline since the Great Depression 
of the 1930's,  and that many of the structural deficiencies of the 
U.S. economy have been intensified by "conflicting and erratic 
short-term economic policies without in many cases providing 
2 
long-term solutions."      The findings of the bill state that 
fundamental economic imbalances have resulted from the lack of a 
3 long-term national economic policy.      The bill recognizes that 
Congressional Record,  21 May 1975, p. S 8831. 
2 
The Balanced Growth and Economic Planning Act, Sec. 202 (a), 
3Ibid., Sec. 202 (b). 
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no one government agency is charged with acquiring and main- 
taining a comprehensive detailed overview of the national economy 
and the complex interrelationships found therein; and that the lack 
of such information precludes the identification of emerging 
4 
problems and detailed comparisons of available solutions.     It 
also recognizes the lack of one governmental body which is 
responsible for formulating comprehensive "long-term national 
economic goals,   ... identification of available and potential labor, 
capital,  and natural resources; and recommendations for policies 
to reconcile goals and resources which would enable the Federal 
Government to determine and rationalize its own impact on the 
national economy."      The Humphrey-Javits bill states that because 
the federal government' s economic decisions directly affect 
individual citizen' s lives,  the process by which a national economic 
plan is formulated should be open and democratic "to enable the 
citizens of the United States to participate fully in the making of 
policies affecting the national economy."     Finally, the bill states 
that the country requires national economic goals which are con- 
sistent with the nation' s economic resources and policies which are 
4IbidL,  Sec^ 202 (c). 
5Ibid., Sec. 202 (d). 
6Jbid_.,  Sec. 202 (f). 
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consistent with the goals.   Both are necessary in order to 
"achieve balanced economic growth and promote the economic 
well-being of all ... citizens." 
One purpose of the Balanced Growth and Economic Planning 
Act is to establish an Economic Planning Board, which every 
two years would be responsible for developing a draft economic 
plan and policies to achieve the plan1 s objectives.   These 
objectives would have to take into account the country' s anticipated 
economic needs and goals; available resources; ways to secure 
adequate raw materials and energy supplies; and long-range 
economic trends.   In order for the Economic Planning Board to be 
able to prepare,  revise,  and evaluate the balanced economic growth 
plan and implementation df the plan, the bill provides for the 
Board1 s continued access to economic information and data needed 
to accomplish such a task.    The proposed act also would provide for 
appropriate public participation in refining and assessing the plan, 
including participation by state and local governments and regional 
organizations, business, labor,  and consumer groups,  executive 
department and agency assessment,  and Congressional review and 
8 
approval or disapproval by concurrent resolution. 
7Ibid.,  Sec. 202 (g). 
8Ibid_.,  Sec. 203. 
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-The Economic Planning Board to be established by S1795 would 
be-comprised of three members,  appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate.    The term of the members is not specified; 
similar to the way the term of the Federal Reserve Board members 
is not specified.    The Board would be located in the Executive 
Office of the President.   It would be charged with preparing the 
balanced economic growth plan; seeking active participation by 
the public at all levels (state, local, regional, private sector) to 
make certain that all segments of the economy have their views con- 
sidered in the plan's formulation; making progress reports on the 
previous (if any) plan's goals and objectives; reviewing federal 
programs to determine their consistency with the approved plan; 
and coordinating the long-range planning of federal departments 
and agencies to assure such consistency in the future.    The Board 
is,  of course,  authorized to appoint staff to carry out their charge. 
Within the Economic Planning Board there is to be. a Division 
of Economic Information.    Through this Division the Board is to 
acquire from executive departments and agencies the economic 
information necessary to formulate and assess balanced economic 
growth plans and perform the other functions required of the Board. 
All information is to be disseminated so that those involved in 
assessing the plan (state, local,  Congressional officials, 
businesses,  etc.) can participate informedly.    This furnishing of 
9Jbid.,  Sec. 204. 
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information would not be a violation of any antitrust laws if 
S1795 were enacted. 
There would also be a Council on Economic Planning 
established within the Economic Planning Board.    This Council 
would consist of the Chairman of the Economic Planning Board; 
the Secretaries of State,   Treasury, Defense, Interior,  Housing 
and Urban Development,  Transportation, Agriculture,  Commerce, 
Labor,  and Health,  Education,  and Welfare; the Attorney General; 
the Chairmen of the Federal Reserve Board,  Council of Economic 
Advisers,  and Advisory Committee on Economic Planning; the 
Federal Energy Administration Administrator; and the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget.    The Council on Economic 
Planning would review,  revise as it felt appropriate,  and approve 
the Economic Planning Board1 s draft balanced economic growth plan 
before it were sent to the President, where it would be submitted to 
the public for comment. 
An Advisory Committee on Economic Planning would be set up 
in order to provide the Board with counsel as to the views and 
opinions of various segments of the public - e.g., business, labor, 
consumer groups,   etc.    The Advisory Committee would consist 
10Ibid.,  Sec. 205'. 
UIbid.,  Sec. 206. 
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of twelve members, four appointed by the President, four by the 
House,  and four by the Senate.   Such members are to receive com- 
pensation for participation and reimbursement for expenses.    The 
Committee is authorized to set up regional or industry sub- 
committees as it finds necessary.   Such subcommittees are to be 
"broadly representative of the particular region or industry, 
1 9 including business, labor,  and consumer interests. 
The balanced economic growth plan, having been prepared by 
the Economic Planning Board with the advice of the Advisory 
Committee and having been approved by the Council on Economic 
Planning prior to transmittal to the President,  is to be submitted 
by the President to Congress no later than April 1,  1977,  and 
every two years thereafter.    The plan is to contain economic 
objectives, with 
particular attention to the attainment of the goals of 
full employment, price stability, balanced economic 
growth,  an equitable distribution of income,  the efficient 
utilization of both private and public resources, balanced 
regional and urban development,  stable international 
relations,  and meeting essential national needs in 
transportation,  energy,  agriculture,  raw materials, 
housing,  education,  public services, and research 
and development. 
12Ibid.,  Sec.  207. 
13Ibid.,  Sec.  208 (a) (1). 
84 
The plan is also supposed to identify resources necessary to 
achieve the stated objectives by forecasting "the level of pro- 
duction and investment by major industrial,  agricultural,  and 
other sectors, the levels of State,  local,  and Federal Government 
economic activity,  and relevant international economic activity, 
for the duration of the plan.' The plan is also charged with 
making recommendations as to appropriate legislative and adminis- 
trative changes in order to achieve the plan's objectives,  including 
suggestions regarding the growth of money supply,  credit needs and 
interest rates,  the federal budget,  taxes and subsidies, policy 
pertaining to antitrust and merger matters,  alterations of industrial 
15 
structure and regulation,  and international trade. 
Along with the plan,  the President is required to submit a 
report which contains supporting data for the objectives and policy 
recommendations listed in the balanced economic growth plan. 
The report is also to consider longer-term economic trends,  and 
to submit recommended objectives consistent with the same goals 
which constrain the balanced economic growth plan.    The report is 
also to contain an assessment of the previous balanced economic 
14Ibid.,  Sec. 208 (a) (2). 
15Ibid.,  Sec. 208 (a) (3). 
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growth plan,  comparing the actual results with the values fore- 
cast in that plan; giving reasons for failure to achieve any of that 
plan's objectives, any steps still being taken to achieve that plan's 
16 
objectives,  and any revisions to that plan.        The report is also 
to include an analysis of the relationship between the report and 
the plan; the analysis is to be prepared by the Council of Economic 
Advisors. 
At the same time that the President submits the plan and 
report to Congress,  the President is to send copies of the plan 
to each state's governor,  as well as to other appropriate state 
and local officials.   Sixty days later., the governor is to return 
to the Joint Economic Committee a report containing comments and 
recommendations from citizens of that state, which were received 
in public hearings within the state.    State,  regional,  and local 
planning agencies may have their plans reviewed by the Economic 
Planning Board to see if they are consistent with the national 
18 balanced economic growth plan. 
16Ibid.,  Sec. 208 (b). 
17Ibid.,  Sec. 2. 
18 Ibid.,  Sec. 209. 
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The plan and report are to be referred to the Joint Economic 
Committee of Congress.   Within sixty days,  each standing com- 
mittee of the House and Senate and each joint committee of 
Congress are to submit to the Joint Economic Committee a report 
with that committee's comments and recommendations regarding the 
aspects of the plan which fall under the jurisdiction of that com- 
mittee.   The Committees on the Budget of both Houses are to 
formulate budget policy recommendations for the same time period 
as the plan. 
The Joint Economic Committee is to hold hearings as it deems 
appropriate to receive testimony from Congressional members, 
federal agencies and departments,  interest groups,  and the general 
public.    The committee*is also to consider the comments received 
from the states,  containing local and regional comments. 
The Joint Economic Committee must report to the House and4 
Senate a concurrent resolution of approval or disapproval of the 
proposed plan,  in whole or in part.   If there is disapproval of any 
part of the plan,  the Committee may include additions or alter- 
natives to or modifications of the plan in the concurrent resolution. 
Such concurrent resolution is to be reported no later than one 
hundred five days after the plan was submitted to the Congress. 
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Congress must act upon the concurrent resolution within one 
hundred thirty five days of the time that the plan was originally 
received from the President.   Once a resolution is adopted, it and 
all supporting documents and reports are to be submitted to the 
President. 
The President may make changes in any part of the plan which 
was disapproved or not approved by Congress.   If changes are 
made,  the modified plan must be published, unless the entire plan 
had been disapproved by Congress,  in which case the President 
would have to revise the plan and resubmit it to Congress within 
thirty days after receipt of the concurrent resolution.    Congress 
then has thirty days to approve or disapprove,  in whole or in part, 
+u •     ^    T        20 the revised plan.. 
Any part of the plan which has been approved is to be im- 
plemented by the executive branch.    The President,  with the 
assistance of the Economic Planning Board,  is to see that the 
executive departments and agencies carry out their programs in 
accordance with the approved objectives of the plan.   One way of 
accomplishing that is that any budget requests, proposed legislation, 
19Ibid.,  Sec. 210. 
20Ibid.,  Sec. 211. 
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rules,  or regulations which the Board considers as having a 
potentially significant effect on the achievement of any part of 
the balanced economic growth plan may be required to be 
accompanied by a statement which shows how the proposed action 
is consistent with the plan,  or a rationale for any significant 
departure therefrom.    The President and the Board are also to 
take actions which will encourage the private sector and state and 
local governments to perform their activities in ways such that 
21 
the plan's objectives will be aided. 
The Act also establishes a Division of Balanced Growth and 
Economic Planning within the Congressional Budget Office, which 
is responsible for performing long-term economic analysis,  in- 
cluding providing information, regarding long-term trends and 
policies necessary for achieving long-term balanced economic 
growth,  as well as other information needed by the committees 
22 
of Congress in conjunction with the balanced economic growth plan. 
Finally, the Act provides for an assessment of existing 
economic information data-gathering analysis and presentation 
21Ibid..  Sec. 212. 
22Ibid.J  Sec. 213. 
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techniques,  as well as information systems, together with 
recommendations for improvements and additional information 
required.    This assessment would be submitted at the time of 
the submission of the first balanced economic growth plan to 
Congress. 
Thus the Humphrey-Javits bill would create an Economic 
Planning Board, whose purposes are to draft a balanced economic 
growth plan every two years,  and to provide for appropriate public 
participation in refining and approving the plan.   In order to 
accomplish formulation of a draft plan,  the Board is to have a 
Division of Economic Information,  which is to obtain and disseminate 
the comprehensive economic information necessary for formulation 
and evaluation of such a plan.   To provide public input to the plan 
in its formulative stages,  there would be an Advisory Committee 
on Economic Planning established as an adjunct to the Board.   The 
Committee would be comprised of members which are representa- 
tive of broad segments of the public. 
Once the draft plan is formulated, the Council on Economic 
Planning,  comprised of Cabinet members and other high-ranking 
government officials of the executive branch,  must approve or 
revise the plan before it is sent to the President.   The plan is then 
23Ibid.,  Sec.  3. 
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disseminated to Congress and to state governors and other 
appropriate regional and local officials, who have sixty days to 
comment on the plan.    The Joint Economic Committee of Congress 
receives the states1 comments and also receives testimony at 
public hearings,  as it deems appropriate.   All comments are to 
be reviewed and incorporated into the report which accompanies 
the concurrent resolution of approval,  disapproval,  approval with 
modification,  or partial disapproval.    This concurrent resolution 
must be reported by the Joint Economic Committee within one 
hundred five days of the time when the plan was initially received 
by Congress. 
Congress must then act upon the resolution within one hundred 
thirty five days from the time it originally received it from the 
President.    The resolution is then sent to the President, who may 
accept Congress1 modifications,  or change any disapproved portions 
of the plan and resubmit them to Congress within thirty days after 
receipt of the concurrent resolution.   Congress must act on the 
President' s recommendations within thirty days after receipt of 
them. 
The Economic Planning Board,  acting in conjunction with the 
executive branch,  is to oversee implementation of the plan, through 
91 
encouraging those affected by the plan to adhere to the ob- 
jectives therein. 
SOLVING THE ECONOMIC CRISIS THROUGH ENACTMENT OF SI 795 
In order to answer the question - "Will enactment of S1795, 
The Balanced Growth and Economic Planning Act,  help solve the 
U.S. economic crisis?" - it is necessary to consider whether the 
bill will help achieve the goals listed in Chapter 1: 
1. The Humphrey-Javits bill will enable the inflation 
rate to be reduced to a manageable level while un- 
employment is also being reduced; 
2. The enactment of S1795 will change the structural 
inequities of the sub-economy,   such as the wide gap 
in income levels and the disparate distribution of 
wealth; 
3. The Balanced Growth and Economic Planning Act will 
reduce the government's tendency to spend more than 
it receives in revenues; 
4. SI795 will provide a holistic approach to national 
policy-making. 
In conjunction with these propositions, the effectiveness of the 
bill itself must be considered: 
5. S1795 will implement the national economic planning 
policies formulated under its auspices in an effective 
manner.   However,  due to the measure's lack of specific 
penalties for non-implementation and/or incentive for 
compliance,  it is possible that only those parts of the 
plan which serve the interests of society's major power 
centers would be implemented. 
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REDUCING INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT THROUGH 
ENACTMENT OF SI795 
This chapter will first consider the ability of the Humphrey- 
Javits measure to achieve the goal of reducing the severe levels 
of inflation and unemployment which now plague the United States. 
The bill specifically directs that the balanced economic growth 
plan contain economic objectives which are set with particular 
attention to the goals of full employment and price stability,  among 
other things. 
Rising demands for justice of distribution of income and 
increased social pressures are believed to have contributed to 
the current economic crisis by straining the economy beyond the 
limits of its capability to adjust.    The Humphrey-Javits measure 
finds that the country requires national economic goals which are 
consistent with the.nation's economic resources.    The bill requires 
that the Economic Planning Board take into account the country' s 
available resources as well as its anticipated needs and goals when 
the Board sets the objectives of the balanced economic growth plan. 
Thus there is a possibility that the bill could establish a plan which 
would constrain social demands to levels which the economy could 
accommodate.   However, the determination of the level of social 
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demands which could be supported by the economy is almost 
certain to be a political determination.   If the level determined 
politically does not equal or fall below that which would be the 
optimum level from a theoretical economic viewpoint,  then SI 795 
will not reduce that portion of inflation and unemployment 
attributable to rising social demands. 
The tremendous worldwide increase in the price of food and 
oil,  although related to the goal of recognizing that the nation must 
function in a global context, has also been identified as a factor 
contributing to the severe levels of inflation and unemployment. 
The Balanced Growth and Economic Planning Bill requires that the 
plan which is developed should identify resources necessary to 
achieve its stated objectives by forecasting relevant levels of 
economic activity by the domestic private and government sectors 
and the levels of relevant international activity.    There is of 
course no guarantee that such inflationary events as the OPEC oil 
embargo could be forecast accurately, particularly since they are 
often politically motivated rather than endemic to the world 
economy per se.   Moreover, the bill does not explicitly state that 
contingency planning should be done in order to help minimize the 
effect on the U.S. economy of events which are largely outside the 
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control of the United States,  should they occur.    The only time 
that the impact of such events would possibly be incorporated 
into the national economic planning mechanism of SI795 is at the 
end of the two-year period, when the previous plan is to be 
reviewed and reasons for not achieving the plan's objectives are 
to be reported along with the new plan.   The bill's failure to in- 
clude a specific provision for contingency planning would probably 
limit its ability to minimize the inflationary impact of other global 
political/economic actions which might occur in the future. 
Another factor which has been identified as contributing to 
inflation and unemployment is the failure of economic theory to 
determine the secondary effects of economic stabilizers such as 
social security, unemployment insurance,  etc.    The establishment 
of a Division of Economic Information within the Economic 
Planning Board should certainly improve the data base upon which 
analysis to determine secondary effects is performed, but there is 
no direct charge within the bill for investigation of the secondary 
effects of economic stabilizers.    Thus it is unclear whether this 
particular factor would be dealt with under S1795.   Moreover, 
95 
Buchanan and Tullock have questioned whether ignorance is truly 
24 the reason for failure to meet economic goals.        Their 
hypothesis raises the question as to whether there were not 
political considerations which led to failure to determine the 
secondary effects of such stabilizers.   If such is indeed the case, 
then there appears to be nothing in SI795 which would alter the 
political opposition to determining the side effects of economic 
stabilizers. 
The unequal development of the planning and market systems 
has also been identified as crucial to understanding and solving 
inflation and unemployment.    The Balanced Growth and Economic 
Planning Act is fairly neutral with respect to Galbraith's analysis, 
since no particular model of the economy is specified; that is, 
should Galbraith's model of the economy be adopted by the economic 
advisors of the Economic Planning Board, there is nothing in SI795 
which would prohibit policies based on such a model.   On the other 
hand, there is nothing in the bill which could be construed as 
actively encouraging policies which vary according to whether they 
are to be applied to firms in the planning system or the market 
system.    Thus there is no way of determining whether the enact- 
ment of SI795 would foster or discourage the uneven development of 
24 Chickering, p. 265, 
96 
the economy which is believed to be contributing to the current 
situation of high inflation and unemployment.    It does seem likely 
that the firms and unions which could be considered as part of the 
planning system would oppose any shift to Galbraith's model as 
the basis for policy-making under SI795,    since the thrust of the 
Galbraithian solution is to discipline the planning system and 
encourage the development of the market system. 
In a similar vein,  O'Connor has identified monopoly sector 
growth as a factor which adds to technological unemployment. 
If policies would be adopted under S1795 which would slow monopoly 
sector growth,  the total unemployment rate could perhaps be 
lowered through slowing the rate of technological unemployment. 
However,  there-is ho guarantee that such policies would be a part • 
of the balanced economic growth plan,  since there is no definition 
as to what constitutes balanced economic growth,  and whether the 
balancing of'growth might be done on the basis of a sector-by- 
sector analysis in terms such as O'Connor uses.   It seems 
unlikely that such analysis would occur without a major shift in 
U.S. political ideology. 
Failure to distribute productivity gains throughout the entire 
society,  although related to the goal of reducing structural 
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inequities of the system,  has also been identified as a con- 
tributory factor to permanent inflation.    The Humphrey-Javits 
bill includes equitable distribution of income as one of the goals 
which the balanced economic growth plan is to consider in 
establishing its objectives.   However,  it is not clear what weight 
would be assigned to a goal which has received such overwhelming 
non-support in the past - for example,  during the 1972 Presidential 
campaign, when McGovern's espousal of income redistribution 
measures alienated many individuals regardless of class. 
Thus it appears that enactment of SI795 could help mitigate 
the severe inflation and unemployment the U.S. is now experiencing 
to the extent that the bill could constrain social demands to the 
level which the economy could support.   It is not clear whether 
SI795 would provide for minimization of the inflation impact of 
events such as the worldwide rise in the price of oil.    The language 
of the bill does not prescribe a model of the economy upon which 
national economic planning policies are to be based; therefore it 
is conceivable that Galbraith' s two-firm model could be used for 
policy-formulation.   Such policies could provide for differentiated 
growth of the planning and market systems, thus reducing that 
portion of inflation and unemployment attributable to uneven 
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economic development.   However, the political opposition to 
adoption of such a model is potentially great,  so the chances are 
minimal that inflation and unemployment which are due to the 
planning system's faster-paced development will be significantly 
reduced by the enactment of SI795. 
REDUCING STRUCTURAL INEQUITIES THROUGH 
ENACTMENT OF SI795 
The second goal which some set for the economy is to effect 
changes to the structural inequities of the system.   In addition to 
the Humphrey-Javits measure's statement that the objectives of 
the plan established by the Economic Planning Board are to be 
consistent with the goal of an equitable distribution of income, the 
bill also contains other directives concerning alteration of 
structural inequities.   For example,  the balanced economic 
growth plan is to make recommendations as to appropriate legis- 
lative and administrative changes in order to achieve the plan's 
objectives,  including suggestions regarding taxes and subsidies, 
the federal budget,  and alterations of industrial structure and 
regulation. 
Even so,  such recommendations would only be that - recommen- 
dations; for any major action to take place, the legislative and/or 
executive branches would have to act as well.   Such a process for 
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change almost certainly assures that any changes in the 
relationships between rich and poor would occur slowly and 
deliberately,  if at all, unless there was a vast shift in the con- 
sciousness of the general public and in their elected representatives. 
Continuing the same line of argument,  in Galbraith' s analysis, 
the state needs to be freed from the influence of the planning system 
before any fundamental changes in the structure underlying the 
economy would take place.   Unless the state is freed from big 
business' and big.labor's influence, plans drafted by the Economic 
Planning Board would not substantially alter the underlying 
inequities of the economy,  despite the stated goals of the bill.   If 
the state were freed from the planning system' s influence, then the 
bill would provide an opportunity for accomplishing some of the 
structural changes which Galbraith and others feel are necessary 
for solving the economic crisis. 
It should be noted that the bill does not even consider alteration 
of the chief structural inequity pinpointed by O1 Connor - that social 
costs are born by the general public, while profits made possible 
by such expenditures continue to be privately appropriated.   S1795 
does not contain a goal of equitable distribution of wealth.   Moreover, 
the Humphrey-Javits measure does not mention the possibility of 
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public appropriation of profits or the possible switch of ownership 
from the private sector to the public.   Only if The Balanced Growth 
and Economic Planning Act were amended to incorporate these goals 
would the structural inequity emphasized by O'Connor be 
diminished. 
SLOWING RUNAWAY GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
THROUGH SI795 
The third goal which some theorists feel the economy should 
be accomplishing is diminishment of the tendency of the level of, 
government expenditures to grow faster than the revenues which 
are taken in.    The Humphrey-Javits measure provides that 
economic goals should take into account available economic 
resources; this provision would probably help control the tendency 
for government spending to exceed revenues,  so long as the 
economic forecasts upon which the available resources deter- 
mination was based proved to be accurate.   If the information by 
which the goals were limited proved to be inaccurate on the high 
side,  then goals and hence government expenditures would still 
be greater than revenues.   Such an error could possibly be 
corrected in the next economic plan, thus controlling the cumulative 
effect of deficit spending on top of deficit spending.   Even so, 
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there is a political aspect which could deter achievement of the 
goal,  even with the provision for constraining goals by available 
resources as a part of SI795.   Some critics feel that government 
expenditures are needed by big business to maintain stability;   thus 
the level of government expenditures needed'by the sector of the 
economy will be expended regardless of the constraints placed in 
the bill.   Also, there is no direct tie between the plan and the 
budgeting process,  although the Committee on the Budget in both 
Houses are to formulate budget policy recommendations for the 
same time period as the plan.   However, the Budget Committees 
have no mandate to restrict the budget to the amount of resources 
and/or revenue which the plan projects will be available.    Thus it 
appears unlikely that the enactment of SI795 will necessitate the 
limiting of government expenditures to the level of revenues, unless 
the planning system's influence over and/or its need for government 
expenditures diminishes. 
HOLISTIC POLICY-MAKING UNDER S1795 
A fourth goal for the economy is that it should function so as 
to enable the United States to live as part of an interdependent 
world,  as Heilbroner has suggested in An Inquiry into the Human 
Prospect.    In that volume he discusses how the world is inter- 
dependent economically,   socially,  and politically.   He concludes 
102 
that all nations,  and particularly the United States,  must learn 
to think globally,  and to live in such a manner as to take into 
account the well-being of all nations of the earth, if civilization 
25 is to survive on this planet.        To evaluate the proposition that 
SI795 will provide a mechanism for holistic planning,  it is 
necessary to examine three aspects of holistic planning:   whether 
the global ramifications of any plan developed under the auspices 
of the Humphrey-Javits bill will be considered; whether the effect 
on the U.S. economy of the political/economic policies of the rest 
of the world will be weighed; and whether it is possible and/or 
desirable to have national economic planning without some form of 
de facto or overt social planning. 
First, will S1795-type planning take place in a global context? 
The Economic Planning Board established under the bill would have 
to establish plan objectives,  which take into account the options 
available for securing adequate raw materials and energy supplies. 
Since the United States is not self-sufficient in either raw 
materials or energy,  such objectives would have to consider the 
relationship of other countries' economic policies upon the 
United States.    The plan is to pay particular attention to the 
25Heilbroner, pp. 21-48. 
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attainment of the goal of stable international relations,  among 
other things.    The plan is also supposed to make suggestions 
regarding international trade.   In addition, the Secretary of State 
is included as a member of the Council on Economic Planning, thus 
assuring that the international implications of the plan would be 
scrutinized by the Department responsible for international 
relations. 
All the above-mentioned provisions of the bill would help 
the planning take place in a global context, particularly in the 
sense of considering the effect of the economic policies of other 
nations on the United States.    The bill is less specific   with 
respect to mandating that the global ramifications of U.S. economic 
policies be considered in national economic planning.    The charge 
to have as a goal stable international relations should not 
necessarily be construed as a new mandate for global concern in 
the sense which Heilbroner feels is necessary; it could be inter- 
preted rather as a logical extension of that which O'Connor terms 
the inherent contradiction of capitalism.   From his perspective, 
stability in the international realm is a goal to be sought by the 
state in order to prevent overthrow of the system. 
Another aspect of a holistic approach is that since the world 
is interdependent socially,  economically,  and politically, the 
104 
question can be raised as to whether it is possible or advisable 
to have national economic planning without some sort of national 
social planning as well?    There is no overt recognition within the 
bill that social planning would either be a necessary concomitant 
to national economic planning,  or that de facto social planning 
would occur as economic planning takes place. 
It is interesting to note that the Council on Economic Planning 
is to include the Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration 
but not the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. 
Yet according to Sommers,  one of the chief causes of the current 
economic crisis has been the rise in social demands,  one of which 
is the pressure for environmental protection.    It seems that 
failure to include the EPA Administrator as part of the Council on 
Economic Planning could increase the tension between economic 
planning and social demands,  whereas EPA representation on the 
Council could provide an opportunity for early balancing and in- 
corporation of social demands into the economic plan. 
One could speculate as to what could happen to a "balanced" 
economic growth plan which were conceived without sufficient 
consideration of social pressures by considering what happened 
to an environmental bill which was developed with a heavier social 
than economic emphasis.    The latest attempt to amend the 
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Clean Air Act of 1970 is indicative of the national climate re- 
garding "balanced" growth versus environmental protection. 
When the authors of the 1976 amendments to the Clean Air Act 
presented arguments that their bill would provide for balanced 
growth by preventing significant deterioration of air'quality,  a 
myriad of voices vehemently avowed that such was not the case - 
that the no significant deterioration provisions of the bill would in 
effect legislate a national no growth policy.    The lack of any clear 
consensus as to what "balanced" growth actually means can be 
discerned from the way the bill died at the end of the 94th 
Congress - by a filibuster spearheaded by two Utah senators 
(Moss and Garn) who are generally not considered as being anti- 
environmental.   Should a "balanced" economic growth plan be con- 
ceived without due regard to social considerations such as 
environmental protection,  it is quite likely that the same kind of 
opposition and stalemate could develop.    Thus it does not seem 
advisable for SI795 to neglect the social side-effects of national 
economic planning. 
It should be noted that other social pressures, such as the 
need for adequate housing, would probably be considered in the 
formulation of the economic growth plan, since the Secretaries 
of Housing and Urban Development and Health,  Education,  and 
Welfare are included in the Council on Economic Planning.    The 
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plan is also to pay particular attention to meeting essential 
needs in housing,   education,  and public services,  among other 
things.   Nonetheless,  since the plan is to be a balanced economic 
growth plan,  rather than a balanced economic and social growth 
plan,  it seems quite possible that the tendency of the planners 
would be to emphasize the economic aspects and let the social 
consequences fall as they may.   If O'Connor is accurate in his 
assessment of the necessity of the state to legitimatize as well as 
to provide conditions under which accumulation of wealth can take 
place,  then the tension of emphasizing the economic and neglecting 
the social should surface in renewed protest against the system. 
EFFECTIVE PLAN IMPLEMENTATION UNDER SI795 
Finally,  in evaluating SI795,  it is necessary to consider • 
whether national economic planning would be implemented effective- 
ly through the mechanism specified in the Humphrey-Javits measure. 
The bill does not specify penalties for non-implementation of the 
balanced economic growth plan,  nor does it make provision for 
specific incentives to encourage compliance with the plan.   One 
could hope that if a national economic plan were truly a product of 
public participation, the public might indeed be convinced that it 
would be in their own best interest to adhere to the provisions of 
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the plan.   However,   such hope would seem to be naive,  both 
from the history of failure of voluntary policy implementation in 
the past,  as well as from the perspective of John Kenneth Galbraith. 
He feels that discipline is necessary to prevent the planning system 
from continuing to dominate the market system and the state; such 
reasoning implies that penalties or incentives would be necessary 
to prevent the planning system from acting in ways which would 
serve its own,  rather than the public purpose. 
The bill also does not specify the scope or level of economic 
planning which is to be undertaken by the Economic Planning Board, 
although it does require that economic forecasting of resources 
necessary to the achievement of the plan's stated objectives be 
done by major industrial,  agricultural,  governmental,  and other 
sectors.   However,  it is not clear whether the plan is to specify 
objectives on an industry - by - industry basis,  a region - by - 
region basis,  a state - by - state basis,  or solely on a national 
aggregate level.    The lack of specificity of the bill on this point 
could lead to serious implementation problems.    Canadian 
Senator Maurice LaMontagne has identified the failure of   Canadian 
planning to present targets for industrial components of the 
economy as one of the key reasons for failure of the Canadians to 
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26 develop a successful economic plan for that country.        Thus it 
appears that even if the Humphrey-Javits bill1 s heavy reliance on 
voluntary compliance were replaced by a series of incentives and 
penalties,  the plan would not necessarily be implemented 
effectively,   since the plan is not required to specify who should be 
doing what to achieve the targets set forth in the plan. 
The Humphrey-Javits Balanced Growth and Economic Planning 
Bill does seem to offer some potential for mitigating the current 
economic crisis on a short-term basis; however,  the bill does not 
really address itself in any meaningful way to altering the 
structural inequities which exist.   Neither does it provide any 
strict control in order to prevent the tendency of government 
expenditures to outrun revenues.    S1795 has potential for being a 
holistic planning mechanism; yet it does not define how balanced 
growth should be determined,  and whether the U.S. is to balance 
the growth of its economy against the growth of other nations, 
particularly those classified as the developing nations.   By 
neglecting some social side-effects of economic planning,  such as 
environmental ones,  the Humphrey-Javits bill seems to open the 
national economic plans established under its mechanism to 
Maurice LaMontagne,  "The Conflict Between Frequent 
Elections and Distant Goals," a paper prepared for the Conference 
on Limits to Growth'75,   The Woodlands,   Texas,  October 19-21, 
1975, pp. 14-15. 
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increased social pressure and opposition.   Whether a total 
national economic plan would ever be implemented (if such a plan 
ever managed to emerge as a coherent whole at the other end of 
the complicated hearing and approval process) is quite doubtful, 
since SI795 lacks specific incentives for compliance and penalties 
for non-compliance.    The measure is also not specific enough 
with regard to the components of the economy which the plan should 
specify in order to assure that the objectives set by the plan would 
be achieved. 
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CHAPTER 4:   CONCLUSION 
This paper began by noting that the decade from 1965 to 
1975 is generally considered as a period of ill health for the 
U.S. economy.   Economic crisis was defined as a time when there 
exists a combination of severe (greather than 5%) inflation and 
unemployment; thirty percent of the last decade would be 
classified as a crisis period under this definition. 
It also discussed goals other than reduction of simultaneous 
severe inflation and unemployment which some theorists believe 
should be accomplished by the economy,  and which also should be 
included as part of the economic crisis.    These were goals such as 
reduction of structural inequities,  measured by indicators such as 
the ratio of wealthy to poor people,  and the wide disparity in levels 
of income, particularly the large percentage of people receiving low 
levels of income and the small percentage of people receiving high 
levels of income.   Another goal which was discussed is that of 
reducing the government's tendency to outspend its level of 
revenues.   A fourth goal considered important by some is that of 
having a holistic approach to national policy-making,  that is,  con- 
sideration of the global ramifications of policies and the implica- 
tions of global interdependence,   as well as the importance of 
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viewing economic policies from the standpoint of political and 
social considerations as well. 
Three different perspectives on the economic crisis were 
examined:   a business perspective articulated by Albert T. 
Sommers,  Chief Economist of the Conference Board; a reformist 
viewpoint voiced by John Kenneth Galbraith; and a radical critique 
by neo-Marxist James O'Connor.    The three economists diagnose 
the economic crisis as stemming from a variety of causes: 
rising demands for distributive and social justice; uneven develop- 
ment of two segments of the economy - the planning system and the 
market system; and the fundamental contradiction of the capitalistic 
system.    In keeping with their divergent diagnoses,  the policial 
economists proposed a variety of contradictory solutions to help 
solve the U.S. economic crisis,  including:   establishment of some 
type of wage and price controls for all labor and industry,  or wage 
and price controls for the planning system only; vigorous enforce- 
ment of antitrust laws,  or exemption from antitrust laws for all 
small businesses; discarding the minimum wage or advocating large 
increases in the minimum wage; limiting government expenditures 
to those which further the public purpose,  or to those which foster 
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the growth of the social-industrial complex.   Interestingly,  despite 
their diverse outlooks and proposed solutions,  all seem to feel 
that national economic planning merits further investigation as a 
possible solution to the economic crisis the U.S. is experiencing. 
Sommers postulates that national economic planning could help 
constrain the rising social demands by limiting them to the level 
of the economy's ability to accommodate such demands; he also 
believes that investigation of such a complex system as the U.S. 
economy would surely prove to be a valuable educational exercise, 
although he cautions that the gains to be gotten from national 
economic planning are both over and understated. 
Galbraith concurs with Sommers in his belief of the need for 
national coordination.   He does not believe that national economic 
planning would automatically serve the public purpose; in fact, 
unless the state were liberated from the influence of the planning 
system,  Galbraith would feel that national economic planning 
would tend to serve the planning system,  rather than the public 
purpose. 
O'Connor believes the development of the social-industrial 
complex will require s6me type of planning in the economic and 
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social spheres to encourage development of housing, trans- 
portation,   education,  and other social services. 
In considering whether national economic planning would help 
solve the U.S. economic crisis, the answer seems to be tied 
closely to those goals which are felt to be appropriate for the 
economy,  as well as to that which is identified as being the root 
cause of the problem,  and to the type of national economic 
planning which would be offered as a solution.   Sommers1 analysis 
would require national economic planning which constrains rising 
social demands to a level which could be accommodated by the 
economy.   Galbraith's diagnosis would see national economic 
planning as a solution if the policies which were formulated were 
based on his "two-firm" model of the economy,  and if they symbiotic 
relationship between the state and the planning system were broken 
so that the national economic plan were indeed free to serve the 
public purpose.   O'Connor believes that unless national economic 
planning proceeds from a socialist perspective, the results will 
provide at best a temporary solution to the U.S. economic crisis - 
a bandaid where surgery is needed. 
National economic planning could help achieve the goal of 
reduced inflation and unemployment; however,   some of the factors 
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which have contributed to the decade1 s high unemployment and 
inflation are political rather than purely economic factors.    The 
ability of national economic planning to alter the political decisions 
and actions which have contributed to the economic crisis is 
highly questionable. 
The Humphrey-Javits Balanced Growth and Economic Planning 
Act would provide a mechanism which could serve to implement 
policies advocated by either Sommers or Galbraith,  or those 
policies suggested by O'Connor as ones which would stimulate the 
growth of the social-industrial complex in the absence of a com- 
plete socialist perspective.   All three economists agree that S1795 
contains a potential for helping to solve or relieve simultaneous 
inflation and unemployment greater than 5%.   Since the legislative 
measure stipulates that in the establishing of the plan's objectives, 
available economic resources should be taken into account, 
Sommers would see potential there for curbing rising social demands 
to reasonable and manageable levels.   Since no particular mode of 
the economy is specifically named in the Humphrey-Javits bill, 
Galbraith would envision the possibility that his "two-firm" model 
could gain acceptance and be utilized as a basis for policy for- 
mulation under the act.   O'Connor would view the potential of the 
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bill only in terms of the short-run possibility of development of a 
social-industrial complex to help reduce simultaneous inflation 
and unemployment by making each dollar spent by the government 
more efficient in terms of the resulting productivity. 
The Balanced Growth and Economic Planning Act would not 
induce rapid changes in the structure underlying the economy 
unless there were a sudden change in public belief regarding the 
need for such changes. 
The bill does not appear to offer much potential for restraining 
the tendency for government spending to exceed revenues. 
Although the legislation provides that the national economic plan 
should constrain goals by the economic resources available,  the 
political influence on government of large corporations which are 
heavily dependent on government expenditures seems to be such 
that unless that symbiotic relationship is broken,   government 
expenditures will continue to be made in response to political 
rather than economic considerations. 
Although the Humphrey-Javits bill is ostensibly a balanced 
growth and economic planning act, the emphasis seems to be 
much more on the economic planning than on balanced growth,  a 
term which is not even defined in the bill.   While the measure 
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would provide for consideration of the impact of other countries' 
economic policies on the U.S. economy, there-does not seem to 
be a corresponding emphasis on considering the global rami- 
fications of U.S. economic policies on the rest of the world, 
particularly as to how U.S. development affects the growth of the 
developing nations.   Neither is there any focus on what the term 
"balanced growth" means domestically, that is, whether there is 
to be differentiated growth of various sectors of the economy,   etc. 
In addition, failure to incorporate social planning into the 
economic plan or to recognize the social side-effects of economic 
planning could create instability and increased social tension in 
the country.   One example of such failure is the fact that the bill 
ignores environmental goals and concerns in stating those 
national goals which the plan is to pay particular attention to in 
setting objectives. 
Also, the bill does not seem to provide satisfactory assurance 
that the balanced economic growth plan would be effectively im- 
plemented.   Heavy reliance on voluntary compliance and weak 
directives as to the shape of the final plan (e.g., who should try to 
accomplish what) seem to be two of the bill's major weaknesses. 
Thus while the concept of national economic planning seems to 
offer some possibility for helping to solve the U.S. economic crisis, 
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particularly for helping to reduce inflation and unemployment, 
the Humphrey-Javits Balanced Growth and Economic Planning 
Bill is not a measure which would effectively provide for im- 
plementation of an economic plan formulated under its auspices. 
It does not guarantee that government spending would be slowed 
to the level of revenues.   It does not mandate a complete 
holistic approach,  although the possibilities for coordination 
under the bill do provide a basis for the beginning of holistic 
planning.    Moreover,  S1795 would not even attempt to achieve 
goals which some feel are key indicators of true economic 
health -- that is,  goals such as reducing structural inequities 
of the economy. 
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